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ABSTRACT
This study examines the effect of the firm's level of 
financial risk on m a n a g ement's prefer e n c e  for full-cost or 
s u c c e s s f u 1 -e f 1orts accounting in the oil and gas industry. 
Agency theory predicts that firms with Increasing levels of 
Iinancial risk have an incentive to switch to an accounting 
method which tends to increase net tangible assets and 
which c r eates more stable earnings in order to avoid 
technical default on loan covenants. Therefore, it is 
expected that s u c c e s s f u l -efforts firms with increasing 
levels of financial risk will tend to switch to use the 
lu l l - c o s t  accoun t i n g  method.
Past studies have used leverage as a s u r r o g a t e  lor 
financial risk, but it is argued in this study that 
leverage is not n e c e s s a r i l y  a good su r r o g a t e  in the oil and 
gas industry. Instead, a variable, debt beta, is d e v eloped 
which r e p r e s e n t s  a market assessment of financial risk. An 
i n f o r m a t i o n a l l y  eff i c i e n t  market con s i d e i s  othei factors 
besides leverage in assessing financial risk, and these 
factors are reflected in the debt beta.
The empirical results indicate that firms swi t c h i n g  to 
the ful l-cost accounting method e x p e r i e n c e  an increase in
vii
i m a n c i a l  risk prior to the change, while firms changing to 
the s u c c e s s f u 1 - e f f o r t s  method have stable financial risk. 
Unlike previous e t udles that used leverage variables as 
surrog a t e s  for financial risk, it cannot be concluded from 
this study that the financial risk level of full-cost firms 
is greater than that of s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  firms. Nor can 
it be generally concluded that the financial risk level of 
non c h a n g e  firms change over time.
"ore importantly, the reaulte of this study Indicate 
that tne debt beta does not always behave in the same 
manner ae leverage variables. These results provide 
evidence that leverage may not be a good sur r o g a t e  for 
financial risk in the oil and gas industry.
viii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study analyzes the eifeet of the level of firm 
financial risk on m a n a g ement's choice of a c c o u n t i n g  method 
in an oil and gas environment.
Several empirical studies have examined the effect of 
certain variables on m a n a g ement's choice of accounting  
method [Watts and Zimmerman, 1976; Deakin, 1979; Dhaliwal 
et a l . , I960]. Variables examined include management
co m p e n s a t i o n  plans, political costs, taxes, regulation, and 
leverage on m a n a gement's choice of accounting method. 
However, no study has examined the effect of the level of 
financial risk on accoun t i n g  method choice.
Due to the e x i s t e n c e  of debt cov e n a n t s  based on 
accoun t i n g  figures, the level of firm financial risk can be 
used to e x p lain m a n a g e m e n t ' s  choice of a c c o u n t i n g  method. 
This r e l a t i o n s h i p  is especially important to identify in 
the context of oil and gas a c c o unting where a s t r o n g  lobby 
exists against the abolition of the full-cost accounting  
met h o d .
This study examinee the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between financial 
risk and choice of oil and gas a c c o u n t i n g  method. Chapter 
One p r o v i d e s  an overview of the study. First, the oil and
1
gas envir o n m e n t  is discussed. Second, the c o n t r ibution of 
this research is considered. Third, the theoretical  
support for the study is examined. Fourth, the research 
quest ions are addressed, and finally, a summary of the 
research m e t h o d o l o g y  which is used in answering the 
que s t i o n s  is presented.
The Oil and Gas Environment
The full-cost method of accounting was introduced in 
the mid 1950s. By 1970, this method had been adopted by 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y  one half of all publicly held oil and gas 
producers, most of which were c l a s sifled as Independent 
producers [Dehne, 1983, p. 55]. The full-cost method 
c a p i t a l i z e s  all p r e - p r o d u c t i o n  exploration, acquisition, 
and devel o p m e n t  coats regard l e s s  of whether the ac t i v i t i e s  
result in a discovery. The s u c c e a s f u l - e f f o r t s  method, on 
the other hand, c a p i t a l i z e s  these costs only when there is 
a direct r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the costs incurred and 
specific oil and gas reserves discovered. Thus, the 
s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t e  method e x p e n s e s  the cost of a dry hole, 
while the full-cost method c a p i t a l i z e s  these c o sts and 
c h arges them against future production.
It is Important to r e c o g n i z e  that the amount of taxes 
paid is not affected by the choice of full-cost or 
s u c c e s s f u i - e f f o r t s  accounting. In this vein, for tax 
p urposes integr a t e d  oil c o m p a n i e s  may deduct 70 percent of 
their intangible drilling costs in the period inc rred (60
3percent prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA '86) ) .
The remaining 30 percent (20 percent prior to TRA ' 86 ) munt 
be capit a l i z e d  and amo r t i z e d  over 60 months (36 months 
prior to TRA '86). Tangible costs are d e p r e c i a t e d  using 
the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) tl RC 168 J .
The Arab oil e m bargo of 1973 prompted Congress to pass 
the Energy Policy and C o n s e r v a t i o n  Act of 1975. This Act 
r equir ed the Securi t i e s  and Exchange Commis s i o n  (SEC) to 
establish s t a n d a r d i z e d  accounting pra c t i c e s  for the oil and 
gas industry by December 1977. The provis i o n s  of the Act 
allowed the SEC to d e l e g a t e  its respon s i b i l i t y  for the 
d e v elo pment of uniform accounting sta n d a r d s  to the 
Financial Accoun t i n g  Sta n d a r d s  Board (F A S B ) , provided that 
the SEC was c e rtain that oil and gas com p a n i e s  would comply 
with FASB sta n d a r d s  CStanger, 1979, p. 154].
The FASB responded by issuing the Exposure Draft of the 
Statement of Financial Accounting Sta n d a r d s  Number 19 < SFAC
19 ) in July 1977 which mandated the use of the 
s u c c e s e f u l -e f forts method of accoun t i n g  [FASB, 1977]. The 
FASB reasoned that the s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  method is 
c o n s i s t e n t  with the conceptual fra m e w o r k  project which 
d e fines an asset as an economic r e s o u r c e  that is expected 
to p r o vide future benefits [FASB, 1977], Because a dry 
hole would not p r ovide future economic benefit, its costs 
s hould not be capitalized.
Fol l o w i n g  issuance of the Exposure Draft of SFAS 19 in
4July 1977, there was an outcry from small independent 
p ro d u c e r s  who c l a i m e d  that a switch to the successful- 
ef f orts method of accoun t i n g  would damage their ability to 
raise capital. These pro d u c e r s  received substantial 
support for their position. One major public accounting 
firm. To u c h e  R o b b  and Company, concluded that a mandated 
s witch  to successful e f f orts a c c o u n t i n g  would impair the 
ability of these firms to raise capital [Collins and Dent, 
1983, p. bl. Also, the Federal Trade C o m m i s s i o n ' s  Bureau 
of Compe t i t i o n  filed a comment with the SEC because it too 
believed that a mandated change of accounting method would 
limit the ability of af f ected independent prod ucers to gain 
financing. The FTC felt that the change would cause many 
independent pr o d u c e r s  to e l i m i n a t e  high risk exploration  
a c t i v i t i e s  completely, which would be d e t rimental to the 
d e v elo pment of our nation's resources [Randall, 1978, 
p. 9 ] .
1n Accoun t i n g  Series Release Number 2 5 3 . issued i n 
August 1978, the SEC y ielded to polit ical pressure and 
rejected mandatory use of the s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  method of 
accounting. Instead, it called for the d e v e l o p m e n t  of a 
new method of oil and gas accounting, reserve recognition 
a ccoun t i n g  tRRA ) , which was to be a type of value-based 
a c c o u n t i n g  C5EC, 19781. RRA was aba n d o n e d  in February 
1981, because of the Inability of oil and gas co m p a n i e s  to 
predict the present value of their future reserves [Katz,
1985 p. 118]. The use of both full-cost and aucceaeful- 
e f forte accounting con t i n u e s  to be allowed to date.
In opposing SFAS 19, independent oil and gas producers 
have contended that their ability to obtain financing for 
new pro]ecte would be impaired. If, in fact, these 
producers' ability to raise capital had been impaired, 
their stock prices should have been affected negatively  
following the issuance of SFAS 1 9 . Several s t udies have 
tested for the ex i s t e n c e  of a negative stock price reaction 
for full-cost firms following the issuance of SFAS 19 
[Collins et al. , 1981; Larcker and Revsine, 1983; and Lye,
1984]. This negative stock price reaction has been 
r eferred to as a debt effect associated with a mandatory 
c h a n g e  to s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  accounting. It is called a 
debt effect b e cause of the belief by these firms that their 
ability to obtain debt financing in the future would be 
impaired. Both the Collins, Rozeff and DhallwaJ C1981J and 
the Lys 11984] s t u dies provide e v i d e n c e  of the e x i s t e n c e  of 
such a debt effect. The possible presence of a debt effect 
suggests that managers of firms with high levels of 
financial riBk c h o o s e  to use the full-cost accoun t i n g  
method, and that the debt effect could be a reason for 
their doing so.
Several s t udies have att e m p t e d  to identify the 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  attrib u t e s  of firms using full-cost and 
s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  accounting. These s t udies g e nerally
have found that full-cost firms tend to be smaller, more 
highly levered, and more a g g r essive in their exploration 
a c t i vities than s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  firms [Deakin, 1979; 
Dhaliwal, 19Q0; Foster, 1980; and Lilien and Pastena,
1902). Attrib u t e s  of s u c c e s s f u l -e f forts firms that 
switched to the use of full-cost accoun t i n g  were examined 
by Johnson and Ramanan [1988] who found that such firms 
exhibit higher levels of financial leverage and exploration  
activity than firms retaining the s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  
met h o d .
The Current State of Affaire
The debate concer n i n g  the need for a uniform method of 
accoun t i n g  in the oil and gas industry has co n t i n u e d  to 
date. C l a r e n c e  Sampson, former chief accountant of the SEC 
and current member of the FASB, believes that the full-cost 
method of accoun t i n g  should be abolished. He contends that 
b uniform accoun t i n g  method in the oil and gas industry 
would make financial s t a t e m e n t s  more c o m p a r a b l e  and would 
el i m i n a t e  periodic abuses of the full-cost method. 
Independent pro d u c e r s  once again are lobbying against such 
a change. They warn that the change would cause many 
co m p a n i e s  to go into technical default on their lending 
agreements. Even Congress, prompted by oil industry 
lobbyists, has asked the SEC not to e l i m i n a t e  full-cost 
ac c o u n t i n g  [Ingersoll, 1986).
The FASB has r e c o g n i z e d  the import a n c e  of c o m parability
7to the decision u s e f u l n e s s  of information in the S t a t e m e n t
of Financial Accounting Concepts No. T w o :
Information about an e n t e r p r i s e  gai n s  greatly 
in useful n e s s  if it can be c o m p a r e d  with similar 
i n formation about other e n t e r p r i s e s  and with 
similar Information about the same enterp r i s e  
for some other period or some other point in 
time. Investing and lending d e cisions essen t i a l l y  
involve e v a l u a t i o n s  of a l t e r n a t i v e  opportunities, 
and they cannot be made ration a l l y  if c o m p a r a t i v e  
i n formation is not ava i l a b l e  [FASB, 1980, par. 111].
financial statem e n t s  of firms using the full-cost and 
successful - e f forts methods are net directly coirnnraole 
b e c ause the net income, asset, and equity amounts differ 
s l g n i i 1 c a n t 1y due to the accoun t i n g  method used.
Therefore, the u s e f u l n e s s  of the i n formation provided by 
these statem e n t s  is greatly reduced.
S i g n i f i c a n c e  of the Study
Both the FASB and the SEC need to understand why so 
many independent pro d u c e r s  oppose the e l i m i n a t i o n  of 
full-cost accounting. To do this, they need to understand  
why managers choose the accoun t i n g  m e thods they use. In 
particular, any d e f i n i t e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between financial 
risk and choice of method needs to be brought to light.
Past s t udies have shown that full-cost firms tend to be 
more highly levered than s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t a  firms [Deakin, 
1979; Dhaliwal, 1980; Foster, 1980; Lilien and Pastena,
198 2; and Johnson and Ramanan, 1988]. H o w e v e r , leverage is 
not neces s a r i l y  directly related to financial risk. For 
example, firms with high a m o unts of leverage but stable
8cash flows could have a lower level of financial risk than 
other firms. '! ne market assesses the firm's level of 
financial risk based on other factors in addition to the 
amount, of leverage. This study includes a variable which 
est i m a t e s  financial risk based on stock market data. This 
variable reveals the true financial risk of the firm as 
perceived by an efficient market.
Theoretical Support
Agency Theory
Agency theory serves as a powerful e x p l a n a t i o n  for the 
e x i s t e n c e  of complex financial con t r a c t s  and optimal 
capital structures. «n essential c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of the 
modern c o r p o r a t i o n  is the d e l e gation of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g  
authority from s e c u r i t y h o l d e r s  to p r o f e ssional managers. 
Agency problems ari s e  when con f l i c t s  of interests occur 
between agents < m a n a g e r s ) and princi p a l s  (existing 
stockholders). The exi s t e n c e  of agency problems is 
normally based on two fundamental behavioral assumptions. 
First, i n dividuals are assumed to act so as to maximize 
their own personal welfare, and second, i n d i v i d u a l s  are 
a s s u m e d  to be rational and have unbiased e x p e c t a t i o n s  
regarding the impact of agency on the future value of their 
wealth 1Barnea et a l . . 1985, pp. 2 5 2 8 J.
There are five broad c l a sses of agency p r o b l e m s  in 
finance. These are on the job perqui s i t e  consumption, the 
risk incentive, the investment Incentive, b a n k r u p t c y  costs,
9and informational asymmetry I Barnes et al. , 1965, p. 3J.
A . On the Job Perquisite C o n s u m p t i o n  - As the 
o w n e r - m a n a g e r  sel l s  equity shares and the fraction of his 
e quity falls, his fractional cla i m  on the o u t c o m e s  also 
falls; and this, in turn, will enc o u r a g e  him to appr o p r i a t e  
larger amounts of c o r p o r a t e  resources in the form of 
perquisites. P r o s p e c t i v e  minority s h a r e h o l d e r s  realize the 
o w n e r - m a n a g e i 'e Incentive for p e r quisites and will, 
therefore, pay less for shares in order to reflect an 
increase in monitoring e x p e n d i t u r e s  by them. This 
increases the cost to the owner of obt a i n i n g  additional 
capital m  the equity markets. The increase in the cost of 
new equity is an agency cost [Jensen and Heckling, 1976 1.
B. The Risk Incentive - in the option pricing 
framework of Black and Scholes 119731, equity can be 
c o n s i d e r e d  a European type call option to buy back the 
entire firm from the d e b t h o l d e r s  at maturity. Because the 
value of the call increases with the varlance of the 
re t urns of the underl y i n g  assets, s t o c k h o l d e r s  have an 
incentive to invest in high risk projects. Rational 
d e b t h o l d e r s  a n t i c i p a t e  this risk shifting p r o blem and raise 
the interest rates at which they will lend capital to the 
firm in order to c o m p e n s a t e  them for the risk that the firm 
will not be able to meet its fixed payments due to 
u n d e r t a k i n g  high risk projects. Consequently, the 
s t o c k h o l d e r s  appear to bear this agency cost CGalai and
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Masulis, 19761.
C. Investment Incentive - S t o c k h o l d e r s  may prefer 
to reject positive net present value projects if the 
b e n e f i t B  are e n j oyed primarily by the debtholderB. This 
occurs when the market value of the project is not 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  greater than the debt obligation.
S t o c k h o l d e r s  do not receive the full benefit of the 
investment op p o r t u n i t i e s  because they partially accrue to 
d e b t h o l d e r s  in the form of a reduction in the probability 
of default [Myers, 19771.
D. Bankru p t c y  Coats - Bankru p t c y  is not costless 
and may c o n t r i b u t e  si g n i f i c a n t l y  to agency costs because 
d e btors will demand a higher interest rate for bearing 
b a n k r u p t c y  costs uncertainty. The increased cost of debt 
is borne by e q u i t y h o 1ders tBarnes et a l . , 1985, pp. 37-381.
E. Informational Asymmetry - In an imperfect
market, information is not c o s t l e s s  and ava i l a b l e  to
everyone. Management may possess information about the 
firm's projects which is u n a v a i l a b l e  to the market. If the
I n f o r m a t i o n  can be revealed effic i e n t l y  to the market, then
the market will value the firm's p r o j e c t s  at a fair price. 
Otherwise, the market may u n d e r v a l u e  or, at times, 
o v e r v a l u e  the firm. The amount by which a firm is 
u n d e r v a l u e d  is the agency cost of i n f ormational asymmetry
LBarnea et al., 1985, p. 38 1.
Agency costs can be divided into two components: the
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agency cost oi debt and the agency cost of equity. Both on 
the job p e r q u i s i t e  consu m p t i o n  and informational asymmetry 
costs are a s s o c i a t e d  with equity, while the agency costs 
a ssoci a t e d  with debt include those as s o c i a t e d  with equity 
plus costs associ a t e d  with the risk incentive, investment 
incentive, and bankruptcy. The agency c o sts of debt are at 
a maximum when all o u tside funding is in the form of debt, 
and equity costs are at their peak when all o u t s i d e  funding 
is in the form of equity. When the marginal agency costs 
oi issuing additional debt and equity are positive, these 
costs can be added to produce a total agency cost curve 
which is LI shaped and offers a minimum agency cost solution 
which d e t e r m i n e s  the optimal capital str u c t u r e  [Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, p. 344J.
If capital markets are efficient and are ch a r a c t e r i z e d  
by rational expectations, then the prices of all securities  
will reflect the relevant agency costs. Thus, the 
owner - manager will get less when selling new shares on the 
market and will incur higher interest rates when borrowing 
funds so that the o w n e r -manager will bear the agency costs. 
Therefore, the owner - manager will attempt to find the 
optimal mix of debt and o u tside equity so as to minimize 
these costs.
The E x i s t e n c e  of Debt C o v e n a n t s
Because d e b t h o l d e r s  have rational expectations, they 
rec o g n i z e  that s t o c k h o l d e r s  have an i n centive to make
dec i s i o n s  which transfer wealth from the d e b t h o l d e r s  Lo the 
equityholdere. Hence, d e b t h o l d e r s  will invest in various 
types of co v e n a n t s  and monito r i n g  d e v ices in order to 
protect their w e a 11 h. Such cove nants protect the
d e b t h o l d e r s  in serving as a d i s i n c e n t i v e  for management to 
e n g a g e  in high-risk a c t i v i t i e s  on behalf of stoc k h o l d e r s  
[Smith and Warner, 1979]. However, the costs of writing 
and enf orcing such cov e n a n t s  are also s i gnificant and are 
themselves agency costs.
When debt c o venants go into technical default, agency 
costs increase greatly b e cause a m e n d m e n t s  need to be made 
to the covenants, and these amendments are c o s t 1y to 
secure. Public debt may be more difficult to renegotiate  
but the cost of r e n e g o t i a t i o n  with p r ivate lenders is not 
costless. For example, the lender may r e quire a new higher 
interest rate, e s p e c i a l l y  if interest rates have changed 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  since Issuance of the debt [Watts and 
Zimmermann, 1986, p. 215].
Firms which are appr o a c h i n g  technical default on their 
debt c o v e n a n t s  have high financial risk. The managers of 
these firms will attempt to minimize agency costs in order 
to maximize firm value; they will choose a c c e p t a b l e  
a c c o u n t i n g  m e thods which serve to reduce the p o ssibility of 
technical default. Ch o i c e  of a c c o u n t i n g  method can affect 
the p o s s i b i l i t y  of technical default, b e c ause as shown by 
Fogelson [1978J, cov e n a n t s  normally include provisions
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based on accoun t i n g  numbers which are defined with 
reference to g e nerally accepted accoun t i n g  principles 
(GAAP). Evidence is provided by Smith and Warner C1979J 
that debt a g r e e m e n t s  usually specify the use of GAAP but do 
not detail how to compute the accounting numbers.
Debt c o v e n a n t s  that use accounting n u mbers are designed 
to restrict a c t i v i t i e s  which would result in a transfer of 
wealth from debth o l d e r s  to e q u i t y h o l d e r s . Both Leftwich 
(1980] and Smith and Warner [1979J d e s c r i b e  provisions 
normally included in debt covenants. Their descriptions 
are based on o b s e r v a t i o n s  from the American Bar 
A s s o c l a t i o n 's C o m m e n t a r i e s  on I n d e n t u r e s , which is a 
c o m p e n d i u m  of typical cov e n a n t s  found in lending 
agreements. These provis i o n s  include dividend and share 
r e p u r c h a s e  restrictions, m a i n t e n a n c e  of working capital, 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on merger activity, r e s t rictions on 
i r v estments in other firms, r e s t r ictions on the dispo s i t i o n  
of assets, and r e s t r i c t i o n s  on additional debt.
Based on agency theory, managers of firms with high 
financial risk will tend to ch o o s e  a c c o u n t i n g  methods which 
Increase net income and net tangible a s s e t s  b e c ause these 
methods wiLl d e c r e a s e  the possibility of technical 
default. M a n a g e r s  of firms with low financial risk will 
not have the Bame incentive to cho o s e  these accounting  
methods, but will do so if r e c ordkeeping is easier when 
these methods are used.
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Positive Accoun t i n g  Theory
The ob j e c t i v e  of positive accoun t i n g  theory is to 
explain and predict accounting practice. The theory is 
important because it can provide those who make d e cisions 
regarding accounting policy (regulators, financial 
analysts, investors, loan officers, public accountants, 
co r p o r a t e  managers) with p r e d i c t i o n s  of, and e x p l a n a t i o n s 
for, the c o n s e q u e n c e s  of their decisions. It is assumed 
that all decision makers will attempt to maximize their own 
utility IWatte and Zimmerman, 1966, p . 3 ].
P ositive accounting theory proposes that b e c a u s e  debt
c o v e n a n t s  are usually deflned by reference to G A A P ,
managers of fir ms with large a m o unts of debt will oppose
those accounting standard c h anges that would reduce
reported earnings or net tangible assets. This follows
from the fact that the p r o b a b i l i t y  of a firm having to
obtain costly amendments to debt cov e n a n t s  Increases when
l everag e increases. The theory identi f i e s  an empirically
t establ e hypoth e s i s  involving the effect of leverage on a
man a g e r ' s  choice of accounting method:
The d e b t / e q u i t y  hypothesis: The larger a firm's
d e b t / e q u i t y  ratio, the more likely the firm's 
manager is to select accoun t i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  that 
shift reported earnings from future periods to 
the current period [Watts and Zimmerman, 1966, p.
2161.
Leverage is often used as a s u r r o g a t e  for financial 
n e k ,  although it is not n e c e s s a r i l y  e q u i v a l e n t  to
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linancial risk. For example, some highly levered firms may 
have stable cash flows that cover their costs of debt while 
other firms with a small amount of leverage may have great 
v a r i a b i l i t y  in their cash flows. In this case, the firm 
with the s m a 11 amount of leverage actually may have a 
g r eater p r o b a b i l i t y  of payment default due to the 
in stability of its cash flows. The debt / e q u i t y  hypothesis, 
theretore, may be restated to predict that firms with high 
financial risk would choose accounting methods which 
increase current earnings.
The _B an king Environment
Through informal talks with several banking leaders in 
Lou i s i a n a  and Texas, 1 some interest i ng aspects of their 
c o n c e r n s  reg a r d i n g  oil and gas loans were revealed. Most 
notably, it was found that while financial ratios, 
pri m a r i l y  those dealing with net worth, are used in oil and 
gas loan covenants, they are not as Important to bankers as 
such ratios are in other industries. In the oil and gas 
industry, the b a n k e r s ' pri mary concern is with proven
1 The b a nkers spoken to are e x e c u t i v e s  with banks in 
Ho u ston and Dallas, Texas, end in S h r e v e p o r t  and Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana. Three of the bankers hold the position 
of Exe c u t i v e  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  of the Energy Division, while 
two bankers hold the position of Senior Vice- P r e s i d e n t  of 
L o a n s .
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dev e l o p e d  producing reserved. Provis i o n s  concerning these 
reserves are included in loan covenants. The c o v enants  
normally do not require that particular a c c o u n t i n g  methods 
be used and da allow firms to change methods, as long as 
the methods used are in a c c o r d a n c e  with GAAP. Thus, firms 
using e u c c e s s f u 1 -efforts accounting possibly could avoid 
technical default by switching to use of the full-cost 
method. Bankers do not see this as a major problem since 
their main concern is with the amount of proven developed 
pro d u c i n g  reserves.
However, all of the bankers spoken to stated that when 
a company is in technical default on their covenants based 
only on financial ratios, some form of action always will 
be taken. When a company enters technical default, its 
financial position is s c r u t i n i z e d  by the bank in order to 
det e r m i n e  the extent of its problems. If the default 
a p pears to be of a e e l f -correc t i n g  nature, the company may 
be granted a cure period during which to correct the 
default. If the default is not corrected, the loan may be 
r e n e g o t i a t e d  at a higher interest rate, extra fees could be 
Imposed on the borrower, or future credit may be limited or 
cut off by the bank. At a very minimum, 1 n the case of a 
minor technical default, the bank talks to the firm's 
management, Bdmonlshing them of the possi b i l i t y  of 
pen a l t i e s  if the severity of the "default" should become 
more pronounced. Therefore, the p o ssibility of technical
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default is a real threat to the cor p o r a t e  manager, since 
pen a l t i e s  could be imposed on the man a g e r ' s  firm by the 
b a n k .
C o n v e r s a t i o n s  with banking leaders revealed that they 
tend to u t ilize the financial ratio provisions of loan 
c o v e n a n t s  as a means of m a i n t a i n i n g  a position of control 
over the borrowing firme In actuality, however, their 
main c o ncern is really with the reserves reports.
Ae stated before, past studies of the oil and gas 
industry have a s s o c i a t e d  the amount of firm leverage 
through the use of leverage ratios with financial risk 
[beakin, 1979; bhallwal, 1980; Foster, 198u; Lilien and 
PaetenB, 1982; and Johnson and Ramanan, 1988 3. However, in 
practice bankers evaluate financial risk baaed primarily on 
reserves reports of the company. They are much less 
c on c e r n e d  with financial ratio analysis in the oil and gas 
industry than they normally would be in dealing with other 
industries. Therefore, the use of a leverage ratio as a 
s ur r o g a t e  for financial risk may not be as appro p r i a t e  for 
the oil and gas industry. Instead, a v a r i a b l e  which 
m easures financial risk based on market data may be a 
better m e asure of financial risk. This study introduces 
such a variable. In an eff i c i e n t  market, r e s e r v e s  figures 
are taken into account when a s sessing financial risk.
R esearch Q u e stions
Ae di s c u s s e d  earlier, when debt c o v e n a n t s  go into
i e
technical default, the corporate manager feels threatened
since penalties could be imposed on the firm by the bank.
Because the full-cost accoun t i n g  method serves to increase
reported earnings and net tangible assets presented in the
financial statem e n t s  while not affecting cash flows, and
b e c ause debt c o v enants are based in part on these
accoun t i n g  figures, use of this method tends to reduce the
p o s s i b i l i t y  of technical default on debt covenants. Thus,
managers of firms with high levels of financial risk should
prefer to use the full-cost accounting method in order to
reduce the possibility of technical default on debt
covenants. This leads to the main research question
addressed by this study:
Does the level of firm financial risk (not only 
leverage) affect the man a g e r ' s  c h o i c e  of full-cost or 
s u c c e s s ! u 1 -e f forts accoun t i n g  in the oil and gas 
induetr y?
In order to answer this general question, four specific 
que s t i o n s  are identified.
(1) Is the level of financial risk of firms using 
the full-cost method higher than that of firms 
using the success!ul e f forts method?
(2) Do firms which switch to the full-cost method 
e v p e r i e n c e  an increase in f i n a n c 1al risk
prior to the change?
(3) Do firms which switch to the s u c c e s s ! u l -efforts 
method e x p e r i e n c e  a d e c r e a s e  in financial risk 
prior to the change?
( A )  Is the level of financial risk of firms which 
do not cha n g e  methods relati v e l y  stable over 
1 1 me ?
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Research H y p o t h e s e s
The research que s t i o n s  were answered through use of the 
lollowing hypotheses:
Hy p o t h e s i s  1
Null: The level of financial risk of firms using
the s u c c e s s f u l -e f f orts method is at least 
as great as the financial risk level of
lirmB using the full-cost m e t h o d .
Alternate: The average financial risk of firms using
the full cost method is greater than that 
of firms using the s u c c e s s f u 1 -efforts 
m e t h o d .
Separat e s a m ples were taken of firms having public debt and 
of those having only private debt.
Although a great deal of switching of accounting
methods is not observed within the oil and gas industry,
some firms have decided to change accoun t i n g  methods. If 
financial risk is related to c h o i c e  of a c c o u n t i n g  method, 
then it would be expected that firms that switch to 
full-cost accounting e x p e r i e n c e  an increase in financial 
risk p receding the change. On the other hand, firms that 
s witch to the s u c c e s s ! u l -e f forts method may ex p e r i e n c e  a 
d e c r e a s e  in financial risk. This leads to the next two 
h y p o t h e s e s :
H y p o t h e s i s  2
Null: The level of financial risk, p r eceding
the time of the change, of firms switching 
to the full-cost a c c o u n t i n g  method decreases 
or is stable.
Alternate: Firme swi t c h i n g  to full-cost accounting
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e x p e r i e n c e  an increase In financial risk 
prior to the change.
Hypot heels 3
Null: The level of financial risk, preceding
the time of the change, of firms switching  
to the s u c c e s s f u 1 -efforts a c c o u n t i n g  method 
increases or is stable.
Alternate: Firms switching to s u c c e s s f u 1 -effoito
accounting e x p e r i e n c e  a decrease in 
financial risk prior to the change.
That most firms do not switch a c c o unting methods
indicates that their level of financial risk may remain
r e l a tively stable over time. This leads to the final two
h y p o t  h e s e B :
Hypotheei b 4
Null: There ie no d i f f e r e n c e  in the level of
financial risk over ti me for firms which 
use the full-cost method and which da not 
switch account ing met h o d s .
Alternate: There is a d i f f e r e n c e  in the level of
financial risk over time for firms which
use the full-cost method and which do not
switch accounting methods.
Hypoth e s i s  5
N u l l : There is no d i f f e r e n c e  in the level of
financial risk over time for firms which 
use the s u c c e s s f u l -e f forte method and which 
do not switch a c c o u n t i n g  methods.
Alternate: Tnere is a d i f f e r e n c e  in the level of
financial risk over time for firms which 
use the s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  method and which 
do not switch accounting methods.
Metho d o l o g y  Overview
The Sample
The sa m p l e  was selected from the 1966 Oil and Gas
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-Journal ' a DGJ 400 which ranks the top -41 <0 oil and gas 
entities by total assets and revenue on a yearly basis.
Only c ompanies with primary SIC codes of 1310 or 1311 were 
Included ae potential sample firms because these firms deal 
primarily in the e x p l o r a t i o n  and production of oil and 
natural gas.
Of the remaining entities, only c o r p o r a t i o n s  for which 
data was available were used in the sample. The ranking 
i ncl'lea many trus^c and p a r t n e r s h i p s  that are ni t 
interest in this study since the concern herein is with the 
behavior of the cor p o r a t e  manager. The period examined in 
this study is 1977 through 1986, which is the ten year 
period ending with the latest year for which the Pi 1 and 
Gas Journal's OGJ 400 ranking is available. The entities 
remaining were d i vided into firms which had not switched 
between i u l 1 -coet and s u c c e s s f u 1 -e f f orts accounting during 
the 1977-1986 time period, and those firms that had 
s witch ed methods during the period. In turn, the firms 
that switched methods were divided into those changing to 
full-cost and those changing to s u c c e s s f u l -efforte  
accounting. All cha n g e  and n o n c h a n g e  firms were then 
separated into firms that Issue public debt and those which 
place only private debt. Only one change firm was both 
integrated and had public debt, so it was e l i m i n a t e d  from 
the study since it may not be c o m p a r a b l e  to firms with only 
private debt.
22
The Variables
Four measures of financial risk are analyzed and 
compared In this study. The m e a s u r e s  consist of three 
variables representing leverage and a variable r e p r e senting  
the firm's debt beta.
to meet the required interest and principal payments on its 
debt. Therefore, a firm's financial risk usually increases 
as the amount of debt it holds rises. Because of this, 
leverage is often used as a s u rrogate for financial risk.
Dhaliwal [1980] tested for d i f f e r e n c e s  in the leverage 
ot full cost versus s u c c e s s f u 1 -e f f orts firms by c o mparing  
their debt to equity ratios. S i gnificant d i f f e r e n c e s  in 
leverage were found, but because equity is affected by
the use of accounting equity in the variable m e asuring  
financial risk. The first leverage variable used in this 
study is the debt to equity ratio using book values. This 
variable is Included as a means of comparing the results of 
the tests to prior research.
In order to avoid the p r o blem caused by using the book 
value of equity, the second leverage v a r i a b l e  in this study 
is the debt to >quity ratio using the market value of 
equity. The third leverage variable, the debt to revenue  
ratio, is examined because r e venue is not affected by
A . The Leverage Variables - Financial risk is an
of the probability that a firm will not be able
met hod could have been due to
choice of full -cost or s u c c e s s f u l -efforts accounting. Thie 
measure indicates the degree of leverage used to generate 
the firm's level of revenue. For purposes of both the 
second and third leverage variables, the market values of 
debt are used for firms issuing public debt while the book 
values of debt are used for firms placing only private 
d e b t .
Ei. The Variable Utilizing Betas - The stock beta, 
which is also called the equity beta, depends on both the 
bueineee risk of the assets held by the firm and the level 
of financial risk of the firm. Because borrowing while 
m a intaining a fixed amount of equity increases the risk of 
the e q u f t y h o l d e r , the beta for the stock of a levered firm 
should be greater than the beta for the stock of an 
oth e r w i s e  identical unlevered firm [Hamada, 19691.
A firm's asset beta reflects the business risk of the 
firm's existing assets. As the firm issues debt, its 
common stock becomes riskier, thereby increasing the firm's 
equity beta above its asset beta. The weighted difference  
between the firm's equity and asset betas reflects the 
firm's financial risk. This risk Increases ae debt 
increases [Brealey and Myers, 1984, pp. 173-1741.
The firm's e q u i t y  beta can be computed by examining how 
the price of the stock has res p o n d e d  in the past to market 
movements. The r e g r e s s i o n  model used to e s t i m a t e  the 
firm's equity beta is referred to as the stock's
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c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  line with the market portfolio [Reilly,
1985, p. 253 1. This is a line of best fit through a 
scatter plot of rates of return for the stock and for the 
market portfolio of stocks over some past time period. In 
the current study, 78 weekly o b s e r v a t i o n s  were used to 
e s t i m a t e  the equity betas. An e q ually weighted index of 
the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange  
was used to represent the market portfolio.
An asset beta reflects business risk, and is equal to 
the equity beta for firms with no debt s i nce these firms do 
not have financial risk associ a t e d  with leverage CBrealey 
and Myers, 1984, p. 1 7 7 J. Therfore, an average of the 
e quity betas of firms with no debt can be used as a 
s ur r o g a t e  for an i n d ustry-wide asset beta reflecting the 
risk of holding crude petroleum. In this study, firms with 
market value based debt to equity ratios of less than .05 
were considered as entities with no debt in their capital 
structure. In most cases, the very small amount of debt 
held by these firms was of a s h o r t - t e r m  nature and was 
c om p r i s e d  of trade payables
Several empirical s t u d i e s  have found that extractive  
industries have strong Industry c o m p o n e n t s  in their stock 
movements [Gaumnitz, 1970; Meyers, 1973; and Livingston, 
1977 1. Therefore, it is r e a s o n a b l e  to assume a constant 
asset beta for the Industry as a whole. This asset beta 
can then be used In the equation estima t i n g  the firm's debt
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beta based on the weighted difference between the equity 
and asset betas.
Compar i s o n  of Financial R i s k Variables
The theory underlying each variable of financial risk 
is somewhat dilferent. The debt to revenue ratio and the 
debt to equity ratios all measure financial leverage end 
assume that leverage is a good sur r o g a t e  for financial 
risk. /e stated before, other factors affect financial 
risk, and in fact, bankers base their assessment of 
financial risk mainly on reserves reports. Therefore, a 
measure of financial leverage may not be as good a 
surrogate for financial risk in the oil and gas industry as 
In other industries.
The variable which est i m a t e s  a debt beta has not been 
used in previous studiee. The variable utilizes market
data to estimate an equity beta and an asset beta, from
which a debt beta is estimated by taking the difference
between the weighted asset and equity betas. This debt
beta reflects financial risk. An unl e v e r e d  firm's asset 
and equity betas are equal, so that for levered firms, any 
d i f f e r e n c e  between these weig h t e d  betas must be due to the 
use of leverage. Since this variable is based purely on 
market data, all factors c o n s i d e r e d  by an efficient market 
in ass e s s i n g  financial risk, including reserves reports and 
the variability of cash flows, is reflected in the debt 
beta.
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T e at of Hypothesis 1
The lire! hypoth e s i s  is used to d e termine if the level
of financial risk of firms using the s u c c e s s f u 1 -efforts 
method is at least as great as the level of financial risk 
of firms using the full cost accoun t i n g  method for firms 
which did not switch methods over the test period of 1977 
through 198£.. Separate teste were made for the sample of 
Jirmc holding public debt and the sample of firms holding 
only private debt. The lour measures of financial risk 
were computed fox each member of the samples using recent 
data through 1
A one-tailed t t e s t  was used to test the null 
h ypoth e s i s  that the level of financial risk of firms using 
the- s u c c e s e l u l - e i l o r t e  method is at least as great ae the 
financial risk level of lirms using the full-cost method 
for each measure of risk. When the variables were not 
normally distributed, a Wilcoxon rank sum test was 
e m p l o y e d .
Test of Hypoth e s i s  2
In order to m e asure the change (if any) in the level of 
financial risk for firms identi f i e d  as switching to the 
full-cost method during the period 1977 through 198B, the 
four measures of financial risk were computed at two times: 
five years and one year preceding the accoun t i n g  change.
For each firm, the level of financial risk five years
the c h a n g e  was matched with the risk level one
yeai jji feeding the change. Descriptive s t a t istics were
used because only seven firms all with private debt 
com p r i s e d  the popula t i o n  of firms switching to the 
lull cost method.
Test of Hypoth e s i s  3
In order to measure the change (if any) in the level of 
financial risk for firms identified as swi t c h i n g  to the 
s u c c e s s ! u 1 -e f f orte method during the period 1977 through 
19fJb, the four measures of financial rf„k were computed at 
two times: five years and one year preceding the
a c c o unting chart ge. For each firm, the level of financial 
risk five years preceding the change woe matched with the 
risk level one year preceding the change. D e s criptive
seven firms with private debt in the population of firms 
switching to the s u c c e a s f u l - e f f o r t s  method. 
lest of Hypot hes is 4
For lull-cost firms tit at did not switch methods over 
the test period, the four measures of financial risk were 
c o m p u t e d  for both the years 1977 and 19B6. Separ a t e  
s a mples were taken for firms having public debt and those 
having only p r ivate debt. The null hypothesis that there 
is no d i f f e r e n c e  in the level of financial risk over time 
for the firms was tested using the matched - palrs two-tailed  
t test for each measure of financial risk for each sample. 
Again, when the var i a b l e s  were not normally distributed.
were once again used because there were only
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Wilcoxon matched - pairs two-ta i l e d  s i g n ed-ranke tests were 
e m p l o y e d .
Test of Hypoth e s i s  5
For firms using the s u c c e s s f u l -efforte method that did 
not ch a n g e  accounting methods over the test period, the 
four measures of financial risk were computed lor both the 
years 1977 and 19flfe. Again, s e p a r a t e  samples were taken 
for firms having public debt and for firms having only 
p r i va te debt. The null h y p o t h e s i s  that there is no 
d i f f e r e n c e  in the level of financial risk over time for the 
firms was tested using the m a t c h e d -palrs two-tailed t-test 
for each measure of financial risk for each sample. When 
the v ariables were not normally distributed, Wilcoxon 
matched pairs two-tailed s i g n e d - r a n k s  tests were employed.
CHAPTER 2
LITERA T U R E  REVIEW
Tine chapter reviews prior research related to the 
methods of accounting for p r e - p r o d u c t i o n  e x p l o r a t i o n  and 
d e v elopment costs in the oil and gas industry. The chapter 
begins with a brief discussion of the history of full-cost 
and s u c c e s s f u 1 -e f f orts accounting. Next, the empirical 
research c o n c e r n i n g  the presence of a debt effect 
associ a t e d  with the mandatory use of the s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  
accounting method is summarized. Third, a review of 
empirical research on the d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  a t t r i b u t e s  ol 
firms using the full cost and s u c c e s s f u 1 -efforts methods is 
presented. As indicated in Chapter One, the results of 
this research has been regarded as e v i d e n c e  that full-cost 
firms have higher levels of financial risk than 
e u c o e e s f u 1 -e f 1orts firms. A possible e x planation of why 
this may be an incorrect i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of the results is 
d is c u s s e d  in the final s e ction of the chapter.
Historical P e r s p e c t i v e  
The fnll-coet method of a c c o u n t i n g  was introduced in 
the mid-1950s, and, by 1970, about one half of all publicly 
held oil and gas pro d u c e r s  had adopted this method [Dehne,
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1983, p. 55]. The accepted use of both m e t hods was not 
q u e s t i o n e d  until the Arab oil e m bargo of 1973 prompted 
C o n g r e s s  to pass the Energy Policy and C o n s e r v a t i o n  Act of 
1975. The Act required the SEC to e s t a b l i s h  s t a n d a r d i z e d  
accoun t i n g  p r a ctices for the oil and gas industry by 
December 1977. The SEC turned to the FASB who responded by 
issuing the Expo&iui e Draft of the Statement of Financial 
Accoun t i n g  Sta n d a r d s  Number 19 t SFAS 1 9 ) in July 1977 which 
mandated the use of s u c c e s s f u l -e f forts a c c o unting [FASB, 
1977].
Following issuance of the Exposure Draft of SFAS 19 in
July 1977, there was an outcry from Independent p r oducers
who claimed that a mandated change to the successful-
e f f ort s method of a c c o unting would impair their a b ility to
raise capital. These producers received s u bstantial
support for their position. One source of support came
from investment banking firms. For example, E.F. Hutton
and C o mpany s t a t e d :
Requiring c o m p a n i e s  that use lull-cost a c c o u n t i n g  
to switch to s u c c e s s f u l - e f l o r t s  a c c o u n t i n g  will 
s t rip those c o m p a n i e s  of hundreds of m i l l i o n s  of 
d o llars of equity and will s u b s t a n t i a l l y  reduce  
their earnings. This will reduce the ability of 
t h ese c o m p a n i e s  to c o m p e t e  for new debt and equity 
capital at a time when the industry needs u n p r e c e ­
dented a m o unts of capital for explorat ion and 
d e v e l o p m e n t  [Collins et a l . , 1978, p. 49].
Also, the Federal Trade C o m m i s s i o n ' s  Bureau of 
C o m p e t i t i o n  filed a comment with the SEC in which it 
o p posed SFAS 19 b e cause it felt that the mandated use of
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s u c c e s s f u 1 -efforta a c c o u n t i n g  would limit the ability of 
Independent pro d u c e r s  to gain financing. The FTC felt that 
this would cause independent producers to e l i m i n a t e  high 
risk e xplo r a t i o n  e f forts c o m p l e t e l y  which, in turn, would 
be detrimental to the d e v elopment of our nation's resources 
[Randall, 1978, p. 91.
Accounting S e r i e s  R e l ease Number 253. issued by the SEC 
in August 1978, succumbed to political pressure and 
rejected the mandatory use of s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  
accounting. It called for the d e v e l o p m e n t  of a new method 
of oil and gas accounting. This method, termed reserve 
r e c ogn ition accounting (R R A >, was based on the present 
value of the companies' reserves. Because of the Inability 
of oil and gas com p a n i e s  to predict the present value of 
their future reserves, RRA was aba n d o n e d  in February 1981. 
The use of both full-cost and s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  accounting 
cont inues to date.
The debate c o n c e r n i n g  the need for a u n i form method of 
a c c o unting in the oil and gas industry is ongoing.
C l a r e n c e  Sampson, former chief accoun t a n t  of the SEC and 
current member of the FASB, believes that the f u l l-cost 
method of a c c o unting should be abolished. In his opinion, 
dry hole costs should not be c a p i t a l i z e d  b e c a u s e  they 
p r ovide no future e c o n o m i c  res o u r c e s  to the firm. 
I n d epe ndent p r o d u c e r s  c o n t i n u e  to lobby against such a 
change. They warn that the change would cause many
com p a n i e s  to go Into technical default on their loan 
covenants. Two cabinet mem-jer u, interior Sec r e t a r y  Donald 
Hodel and Energy Sec r e t a r y  John Herrington, took the 
unusual step of urging the SEC not to el i m i n a t e  the use of 
full-cost accounting, warning that it would stifle energy 
e x p l o r a t i o n  [Ingersoll, 19SB, Sec. 1, p. 9 1.
Studies Testing the Debt Effect of the M a ndatory 
Use of S u c c e s s f u l -Efforts Accounting
Independent producers oppose the abolition of full-cost 
accounting because they believe that their ability to 
obtain financing, pri m a r i l y  from banks, would be impaired. 
This belief suggests the e x i s t e n c e  of a debt effect 
associated with the mandatory use of s u c c e s s f u 1 -efforts 
accounting. Several studies, which are outlined below, 
have tested for the e x i s t e n c e  of a debt effect associated 
with SFAS 1 9 .
Collins, Rozeff, and Dhaliwal [19B1]
Collins et al. tested for the e x i s t e n c e  of a debt 
effect associated with S FAS 19 by testing the hypothesis  
that full-cost firms with loan c o v e n a n t s  defined in terms 
of reported ac c o u n t i n g  numbers e x p e r i e n c e d  g r eater negative 
abnormal security returns as a result of SFAS 19 than did 
those full-cost firms without such covenants.
The a u t hors also tested the h y p o t h e s i s  that full-cost 
firms with manage m e n t  c o m p e n s a t i o n  plans written in terms 
of accoun t i n g  n u m b e r s  would ex p e r i e n c e  lower r e turns than
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firms without such plans following the issuance of SFAS 
V3. Because only three firms in the sample with such 
c o m p e n s a t i o n  plans did not also have loan covenants, a 
joint variable was o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d  through the use of a 
dummy variable wherein firms with either debt cov e n a n t s  or 
management c o m p e n s a t i o n  plans defined in terms of 
a ccoun t i n g  numbers were assigned a one, while other firms 
were assigned a zero.
A multiple regres s i o n  based on six var i a b l e s  was 
performed. The variable Included (1) the p e r c e n t a g e  change 
in total s t o ckholder equity resulting lrom i m p l e mentation 
of SFAS 1 9 . <2) the debt/ e q u i t y  ratio, (3) the proportion
of revenues d e voted to e x p l o r a t i o n  and production, <4) the 
p o s s ession of public versus private debt, and (5) the size 
of the firm in a d d i t i o n  to the dum m y  variable defined  
above. The regression utilized returns for a two week 
period s u r r o u n d i n g  issuance of the E x p o s u r e  Draft of SFAS 
19 in July 1977.
The variable d e fined by the e x i s t e n c e  of a debt 
covenant or a manage m e n t  c o m p e n s a t i o n  plan written In terms 
of accoun t i n g  n u m b e r s  did prove to be s i g n i f i c a n t  along 
with the var i a b l e s  for the p e r c e n t a g e  c h a n g e  in 
stockholders' e q u i t y  and firm size. C o l l i n s  et al. 
co n c l u d e d  that full-cost firms with eit h e r  debt covenants 
or manage m e n t  c o m p e n s a t i o n  plans tied to a c c o u n t i n g  numbers 
would suffer a d v erse e f fects if forced to switch to using
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the s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  method.
Larcker and Revalne [1983]
Larcker and R e v a l n e  tested for the presence of a debt 
effect associ a t e d  with 5F AS 1g by exa m i n i n g  market returns 
for 52 full-cost and 42 s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t e  firms for five 
days on either side of the issuance of the Exposure Draft. 
They reasoned that if there are debt effects, then their 
c o n s e q u e n c e s  could be e x p e c t e d  to occur when a debt 
covenant exists and e a r n i n g s  are expected to d e c r e a s e  upon 
i m p 1e m e n t a t i o n  of SFAS 1 9 . Also, the debt effect should 
increase as the ratio of long-term debt to the market value 
of equity increases and b s  the p e r c e n t a g e  of revenues from 
oil and gas a c t i v i t i e s  increases.
A variable r e p r e s e n t i n g  the debt effect was 
o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d  by forming a product of the d i c h o t o m o u s  
variable for the e x i s t e n c e  of a debt covenant, the 
d i c h o t o m o u s  variable for the change in e a r n i n g s  arising 
from i n c entive aspects, the ratio of lon g - t e r m  debt to the 
market value of equity, and the p e r c e n t a g e  of r e v e n u e s  from 
oil and gas activities. Var i a b l e s  for inc e n t i v e  and 
political e f f ects were also included in the study.
A multiple r e g r e s s i o n  which tested for the s i g n i f i c a n c e  
of inc e n t i v e  and political e f f e c t s  as well as for a debt 
effect was performed. The resulting c o e f f i c i e n t  for a debt 
effect had the e x p e c t e d  n e g a t i v e  sign but was not 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  significant, pro v i d i n g  no e v i d e n c e  of a debt
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effect. The incentive e f fects variable was significant 
while the political e f f e c t s  variable was not.
Lys [10841
Lys i n v e s t i g a t e d  the stock price e f fects of a mandated 
c hange to s u c c e s s f u l -e f f o r t s  accoun t i n g  by e x a mining stock 
p r ice returns on and s u r r o u n d i n g  three events; issuance of 
the E x p o s u r e  Draft of SFAS 19. issuance of SFAS 1 9 . and 
issuance by the SEC of ASR 253 which rejected the mandated 
change. Analysis of the returns revealed that abnormal 
returns are a s s o c i a t e d  only with the issuance of the 
E x p o s u r e  Draft. He cr i t i c i z e d  the C o llins et al. study 
b e cause they used the debt to equity ratio as a proxy for 
the t i g htness of debt constraints. Lys points out that 
this ratio is a poor proxy b e cause firms with little 
v a r i a b i l i t y  in their cash flows have high debt to equity 
ratios, but the higher the variability of their cash flows, 
the closer the firms are likely to be to their debt 
const r a i nt s because the debt is more risky.
An attempt is made by Lys to resolve this p r oblem in 
the study by Including in the c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l  r e g r ession an 
e s t i m a t e  of the v a r i a n c e  of the firm's cash flows in 
a d d i t i o n  to the debt to equity ratio. The model upon which 
the est i m a t o r  is based is the Black and S c h o l e s  [1973] 
op t i o n  p r icing model. It utilizes an e s t i m a t e  of the daily 
s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  of returns adjusted for the firm capital 
s t ruct u r e .
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Other variables used Include the d e b t 's term to 
maturity, the propor t i o n  of public to private debt, the 
s t a n d a r d ' s  effect on the Inventory of payable funds, the 
s t a n d a r d ' s  effect on the firm's proximity to the statutory 
dividend paying restrictions, the proportion of revenues 
d e rived from oil and gas operations, and a debt refinancing 
cost variable that is est i m a t e d  as the d i f f e r e n c e  between 
the debt's market and nominal values.
The relation between the debt variables and the 
abnormal returns was s i gnificant at the .05 level and 
e x p l a i n e d  52 percent of the c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l  abnormal return 
variations. However, only the variables e s t i m a t i n g  the 
cash flow variance and the debt to equity ratio were 
significant. This is consis t e n t  with Lys' contention that 
the o m i s s i o n  of a variable estimating cash flow variance 
induces the insig n i f i c a n c e  of the debt to equity ratio in 
the C o l l i n s  et al. study. However, the equation deriving 
the cash flow variable includes an adjustment utilizing the 
ratio of the book value of debt to the market value of 
equity. This is an adjustment for leverage and could cause 
the variable to behave as a leverage variable.
I m p l i c a t i o n s  of Studies
Both the C o l lins et al. [19813 and the Lys [1984 3 
st u d i e s  provide e v i d e n c e  of the e x i s t e n c e  of a debt effect 
associ ated with the m a n datory use of successf ul-efforts  
a c c o u n t i n g  for firms using the full-cost method. The
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possible presence of a debt effect for full-cost firms 
provides an e x p l a n a t i o n  of why managers of firms with high 
levels of financial risk may choose to use the full-cost 
accoun t i n g  method and oppose its abolition.
Studies Testing for Diff e r e n t i a t i n g  
Attrib u t e s  of PirniB
Several studies have att e m p t e d  to identify the 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  a t t r i b u t e s  of firms using full-cost and 
s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  accounting. These studies, which are 
outlined below, found that in general full-cost firms tend 
to be smaller, more highly levered, and more aggressive in 
their e x p l o r a t i o n  activi t i e s  than s u c c e s s f u 1 -efforts firmB. 
Deakln [1979]
Deakin i n v e s tigated seven d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  variables 
b e t ween full-cost and s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  firms. Three 
var i a b l e s  were used as indicators of a g g r e s s i v e n e s s  in 
exploration. These variables were a v erage depth of 
e x p l o r a t o r y  wells, the ratio of the number of exploratory 
wells to revenues, and the ratio of the number of 
development wells to total wells. The debt to revenue 
rat i o  and the rat i o  of capital e x p e n d i t u r e s  to revenue were 
used as I n d i c a t o r s  of need for external capital. Total 
r e v enue was used as a m e asure of firm size, and the 
maturity of the company was measured by the age of the 
co mpany in years.
The var i a b l e s  were tested in a multiple discriminant
a n a l y s i s  which was significant at the . Ol level, having a 
can o n i c a l  corr e l a t i o n  c o e fficient of -56. However, the
the age variable, the debt to revenue ratio, and the ratio 
of capital e x p e n d i t u r e s  to revenue.
A c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  analysis utilizing all of the relevant 
va r i a b l e s  was able to cor r e c t l y  c a t e g o r i z e  full-cost and 
s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  firms 71.7 percent of the time. 
D i c h o t o m o u s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  tests based on each variable 
s e p a r a t e l y  revealed that the debt to revenue ratio was by 
far the beet e x p l a n a t o r y  variable, correctly classifying  
firms 73.6 percent of the time. Deakln con c l u d e d  that 
full-cost firms were not more aggres s i v e  in exploration 
a c t i v i t i e s  than s u c c e s s f u 1 -efforts firms, but were more 
highly levered and made greater use of o u tside capital. 
Dhallwal C19801
Dhaliwal examined the effect of the firm's capital 
s t r u c t u r e  on m a n a g e m e n t ' s  choice of full-cost or 
s u c c e s s f u 1 -efforts accounting in the oil and gas industry. 
He compared the debt to equity ratios for the year 1976 for 
72 ful l - c o s t  firms and 41 s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  firms. 
Ful l - c o s t  and s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  firms were matched based 
on revenue, r e s u l t 1ng in 33 matched pairs. A  m a t c h e d -pairs 
t-test revealed a signi f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  in the debt to 
equity ratios of full-cost and s u c c e s s ! u 1-e f forts firms at 
the .09 level for a o n e - t a i l e d  test in which the alternate
only v ariables which were
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h y p o t h e s i s  was that the debt to equity ratios of full-cost 
firms were higher than those of s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  firms.
Because a firm's amount of equity is affected by their 
choice of full-cost or s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  accounting, this 
could have induced significant results in the previous test 
comparing debt to equity ratios. In order to avoid the 
effect of method of accounting on the debt to equity 
ratios, the average total amounts of long-term debt between 
the two groups were examined as an alter n a t i v e  tc the 
p revio us test. It vas hyp o t h e s i z e d  that if full-cost and 
s u c c e s s f u 1 -e f forts firms were to have equal debt to equity  
ratios if equity were not affected by accounting method, 
then their total debt must be e q u a l . A matched - p a i r s  
o n e - tailed t-test was then performed to d e t e r m i n e  if 
full-cost and s u c c e s s f u 1-efforts firms matched by size have 
equal amounts of debt. The a l ternate hypoth e s i s  was that 
full-cost firms would have greater debt than successful* 
e f forts firms. The results were significant at the .025 
level, from which Dhaliwal co n c l u d e d  that managers of more 
highly levered firms tend to select the full-cost method of 
account ing.
Llllen and P a s tena C19B2]
Lilien and Pastena not only e x a m i n e d  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  
v a r i a b l e s  between full-coBt and s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  firms, 
but also tested for the d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  ability of these 
variables c o n c e r n i n g  c h o i c e s  in i n t r a m e t h o d  appl i c a t i o n s  of
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full-cost and s u c c e s s f u l -e f forte accounting. Prior to the 
SEC's Issuance of ASR 253 and ASR 256 in 1978, oil and gas 
m anagers had c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i s c r e t i o n  in c h o o s i n g  procedures 
with which to apply either full-cost or s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  
account ing. The SEC r u 1 lngs spe c i f l e d  how to apply each 
method and required firms to adjust retained earni n g s  
re t r o a c t i v e l y  to reflect what it would have been if the 
s pe c i f i e d  proced u r e s  had been in effect all along. Firms 
were required to make negative a d j u s t m e n t s  to retained 
e a r n i n g s  if they p r e v iously followed rntramethod policies 
which produced higher net income than the spe c i f i e d  
procedures, and made positive a d j u s t m e n t s  to retained 
e a r n i n g s  if p r e v i o u s l y  used proced u r e s  produced i - ,<er net 
Income than the new procedures.
Lilien and Pastena used these adju s t m e n t s  ae a measure  
of the mag n i t u d e  of intramethod d i f f e r e n c e s  which existed 
in the oil and gas industry before the SEC's conformity  
rulings. The d i s c l o s u r e  of these adju s t m e n t s  for 102 
sample firms were o b t a i n e d  from their 1978 Form 10-Ks filed 
with the SEC. Four v a riables were examined in order to 
d e t e r m i n e  if they could d i s c r i m i n a t e  first between 
full-cost and s u c c e s s f u l -e f forts firms, second, between 
i n t r a m e t h o d  choices, and lastly, between joint c h oices of 
full-cost or s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  a c c o u n t i n g  and intramethod 
p r o c e d u r e s .
The first v a r i a b l e  was a political v a r i a b l e  measured by
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revenue. It was h y p o t hesized that size was positively 
ca r - e l a t e d  with the use of s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  accounting 
and intramethod c h o ices which minimize income. The 
leverage variable used was the ratio of debt to e q u i t y . 
Leverage was expected to be positively correl a t e d  with the 
use of full-cost a c c o u n t i n g  and i n t ramethod policies which 
maximize income. The level of e x p l o r a t o r y  risk was 
measured by the ratio of the number of dry w e l 1s to total 
wells. It was h y p o t h e s i z e d  that explo r a t o r y  risk should be 
positively c o r r e l a t e d  with the use of full-cost accounting  
and intramethod c h oices which defer expenses and maximize  
income. Because full-cost accounting was introduced in the 
1950s, older firms using full-cost accounting would have 
had to make a d e l i b e r a t e  switch to the method. Therefore, 
age was used as a consi s t e n c y  variable where age was 
e x p e c t e d  to be positively correl a t e d  with the use of 
s u c c e s s f u 1 -e f f orte accounting and intramethod policies 
which minimize income.
The variables were examined using N - c h o t o m o u s  probit 
a n a l y s i s  <NPA>, multiple d i s c r i m i n a n t  a n a l y s i s  (H D A ), and 
r e g r e s s i o n  analysis. When testing for i n termethod choice, 
the NPA model found age, e x p l o r a t o r y  aggressiveness, and 
r e venue to be s i g n i f i c a n t  as discriminators. The model was 
s i gnificant at t h e . 001 level and achieved 72 percent 
correct classification. The probit model was also 
s i g n i f i c a n t  at the .001 level when applied to intramethod
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choice, with a 543 percent correct prediction rate. All 
lour variables were significant In the h y p o t h e s i z e d  
direction. When exa m i n i n g  the dual intermethod and 
intramethod choice, the model was significant at the .Cl 
level and had an 87 percent correct predic t i o n  rate. The 
results indicated that revenue and age are co r r e l a t e d  with 
income min i m i z a t i o n  while leverage and e x p l o r a t o r y  
a g g r e s s i v e n e s s  are co r r e l a t e d  with income maximization.
The results of the regression analysis revealed that 
for intramethod choices, revenue and age were positively  
c o r r e l a t e d  with income min i m i z a t i o n  while e x ploratory 
a g g r e s s i v e n e s s  and leverage were positi v e l y  c o r r elated with 
Income maximization. All variables were significant and in 
the h y p o t h e s i z e d  dir e c t i o n  when testing for intermethod 
choice and for the dual intermethod and i n tramethod choice.
The MDA model achieved a successful c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  rate 
of 72.5 percent for intermethod choice, 73.5 percent for 
in tram ethod choice, and 86.8 percent for the dual choice.
All v a r iables were significant and in the hypothesized 
d i rect i o n .
Lillen and Pastena concluded that full-cost and 
s u c c e s s f u 1 -e l forts firms could be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  by their 
level of e x p l o r a t o r y  aggressiveness, use of leverage, age, 
and revenue amount. Intramethod choices could also be 
d i s c r i m i n a t e d  based on these same variables.
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Johnson and Ramanan C19Q8]
Johnson and Ramanan examined the d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  
a t t r i b u t e s  between s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  firms which decided 
to switch to full-cost a c c o unting and s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  
firms which did not change methods over the 1970 through 
1976 test period. The sample con s i s t e d  of 19 firms which 
s witch ed from s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  to full-cost accounting 
during the test period, and 55 firms which used the 
s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  method throughout that period.
Six var i a b l e s  were examined for their d i s c riminatory  
ability. A variable r e p r e s e n t 1ng firm size was measured by 
the natural logarithm of total ope r a t i n g  revenues. Three 
variables were used as s u r r o g a t e s  for the firm's proximity 
to rest r i c t i v e  covenants. The first was a leverage 
v ariab le measured by the ratio of long-term debt and 
preferred stock to tangible assets. The second variable 
repr e s e n t i n g  proximity to restrictive c o v e n a n t s  was the 
ratio of earnings before interest to interest expense, and 
the third was the ratio of cash di v i d e n d s  paid common 
s t o c k h o l d e r s  to ava i l a b l e  u n r e s tricted retained earnings.
Two financial measures of e x p l o r a t i o n  activity were used as 
s u r r o g a t e s  for drilling intensity. These were the ratio of 
capital e x p e n d i t u r e s  to total ope r a t i n g  revenues, and 
r evenu es from oil and gas activi t i e s  as a percent of total 
o p e r a t i n g  revenues.
Logit analysis was used to e v a l u a t e  the ability of
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these .aridbl^a to d i f f e r e n t i a t p  between change and 
non n h a n g e  sample firms. The analysis was per f o r m e d  in 
event time using randomly selected subsamples of control 
group firms. This was done because the number of firms 
changing from s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  to full-cost accounting 
was too small for st a t i s t i c a l l y  meaningful comparisons.
The logit models for all years were s i g nificant with an 
overall c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  success rate ranging from 7 2  to 78. 2 
percent. However, only the leverage variable was 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i gnificant for all years, while the ratio of 
capital e x p e n d i t u r e s  to total ope r a t i n g  revenues was 
s i gnificant for the year of change and the year preceding 
the change. The di s c r e t i o n a r y  power of the remaining 
variables was not st a t i s t i c a l l y  significant.
The analysis revealed that oil and gas firms which 
changed from s u c c e s s f u 1 -efforts to full-cost accounting had 
higher levels of leverage and capital e x p e n d i t u r e s  per 
sales dollar in the year of and for two years preceding 
full-cost adoption when compared to firms which retained 
use of the s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  method. In order to provide 
further insights into the timing of the d e c i s i o n  to change 
to full-cost accounting, a n n u a l i z e d  rates of growth were 
e x a m i n e d  for total debt financing, leverage, capital 
expenditures, and capital e x p e n d i t u r e s  per sales dollar for 
each firm switching to the full-cost method for each of 
five years prior to the change through one year following
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the change. It was found that firms swi t c h i n g  from the 
s u c c e s s f u l -e f fortB to the full-cost method e x p e r i e n c e d  
abnormal Increases both in total debt and capital 
e x p e n d i t u r e  growth at least two years before full-cost 
adopt ion.
The a u t hors con c l u d e d  that the decision to change to 
the use of full-cost accounting is a s s o c i a t e d  with high 
leverage and capital e x p e n d i t u r e  levels, and also with 
concurrent increases in debt financing and e x ploration  
activities. They found these r e sults to be consis t e n t  with 
the debt covenant hypoth e s i s  in that highly levered firms 
that issue additional debt and/or expand their drilling 
a c t i v i t i e s  increase their likelihood of technical default 
and, therefore, prefer accoun t i n g  methods that reduce 
default probability.
Implications of Studies
These studies have shown that full-cost firms tend to 
be more highly levered than s u c c e s s f u 1-e l l orts firms. This 
e v i d e n c e  has been inte r p r e t e d  as meaning that full-cost 
firms have more financial risk. However, leverage is not 
n e c e s s a r i l y  d i r e c t l y  related to financial risk. T he market 
assesses the firm's level of financial risk based on other 
factors in addition to the amount of leverage. These 
f a ctors could Include v a r iability of cash flows, and 
u n c e r t a i n t y  of pri c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  for c r ude petroleum. A  
limitation of the s t u dies reviewed is that the authors only
measure leverage. Deakin C1979] utilized the debt to 
revenue ratio, Dhallwal t!9BOJ used the debt to equity 
ratio and the amount of long-term debt, Lillen and Paetena 
[ 1982 J used the debt to equity ratio, and Johnson and 
Ramanan [1S88J utilized the ratio of long-term debt and 
preferred stock to tangible assets. Even though these 
va r i a b l e s  revealed that full-cost firms are more highly 
levered, It cannot be interpreted as meaning that they have 
more financial risk.
Based on personal interviews with several bankers, it 
is apparent that bankers evaluate the financial risk of oil 
arid gas com pan lee primarily based on the firm's reserves 
reports. Therefore, the use d ! leverage as a sur r o g a t e  for 
financial risk may not be appropriate in the oil and gas 
industry. In an efficient market, reserves figures 
information is impounded into market data. Thus, financial 
risk should be measured relative to market data which, in 
an efficient market, includes all signi f i c a n t  information.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This Etudy ar.alyzee the effect of the level of 1 i rm 
financial risk on m a n a g e m e n t ’s choice of a c c o u n t i n g  method 
in an oil and gas environment. More specifically, this 
study examines whether firms using the B u c c e a e f u l - e f f o r t s  
and full-cost accounting methods have different levels of 
financial risk.
This chapter presents the m e thodology used in the study 
to answer the above question. The first section discusses 
the time frame of the study. Second, the sample selection  
te c h n i q u e s  and criteria are described. Third, the 
d e v e l o p m e n t  of the var i a b l e s  is presented, and fourth, the 
hy p o t h e s e s  are listed and statistical tests are explained. 
Finally, a brief summary of the issues outlined in this 
chapter is presented.
Time Period
The test period for this study ie from 1977 through 
1986. This is a ten year period ending with the latest 
year for which the p u blished ranking of oil and gas 
e n t i t l e s  from which the sample was drawn is available. It 
also should be noted that 1977 is the first full year in
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which prices of some type of domestic pet r o l e u m  were 
totally decontrolled. The price of oil from stripper wells 
b ecame d e c o n t r o l l e d  in September 1S76.
S ample Selection
The sample of firms used in this study was drawn from 
the Oil and Gas Journal's QGJ 400 which ranks the top 400 
oil and gas entities by total assets and revenue on a 
yearly basis. The 138t> ranking was used. All c o m panies  
with primary SIC codes of 1310 and 1311 were included in 
the study since they engage primarily in the explo r a t i o n  
and production of crude pet r o l e u m  and natural gas. Firms 
dealing primarily in transmission, pipelines, refining, 
ountract drilling or other ielated areas have different SIC 
codes and were e l i m i n a t e d  as potential sa m p l e  firms. This 
procedure e n sured that the firms included In the samples 
de r i v e  a s i g nificant portion of their income from 
e x p l o r a t i o n  and production, and, therefore, their choice of 
the f u l l c o s t  or s u c c e s s f u 1-efforts accoun t i n g  method would 
have a s i g n i f i c a n t  impact on their financial statements.
Other inc l u s i o n  c r i t e r i a  con s i s t e d  of the following:
1. The firm must be incorporated.
2. The firm must be listed on the American or
New Vork stock e x c h a n g e s  or be on the
National A s s o c i a t i o n  of S e c u r i t i e s  Dealers
Aut o m a t i c  Q u o t a t i o n s  System (NASDAQ).
3. The firm must have lO-Ke on file with the 
SEC for the period tested for each sample.
The first r e q u i r e m e n t  is included since the concern of
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this study is with the behavior of the corporate manager. 
Also, because di s c l o s u r e  req u i r e m e n t s  differ for bu s i n e s s e s 
which are not incorporated, only c o r p o r a t i o n s  were 
included. Plaster limited p a r t n erships were not included 
due to ( 1 ) the u n a v a i l a b i l i t y  of data for them over the 
entire test period, and (2) the d i f f e r e n c e s  in di s c l o s u r e  
requirements. The remaining r e q u i rements relate to data 
availability.
The entities meeting the above r e q u i rements were 
divided into firms which had not switched between full cost 
and e u c c e e e f u 1-e f forts accounting during the 1977-1986 time 
period, and those firms w Pile Pi Pi ad switched methods during 
this period. The swi t c h i n g  firms were then divided into 
tPiose cPianging to full-cost and those changing to 
s u c c e s s f u 1 -efforte accounting. Those firms which did not 
cPiange metPiode over the test period were separated into 
firms maint a i n i n g  s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  and firms maintaining 
full-cost accounting. Each of the change and nonchange 
c a t e g o r i e s  was then divided into firms issuing public debt 
and firms issuing only private debt. All but one of the 
firms changing m e thods placed only private debt. The firm 
with public debt was eliminated from the study s i nce it may 
not be c o m p a r a b l e  to firms with only p r i v a t e  debt.
The following number of firms met all of the above
requiremeiits in each category:
C a t e g o r y _________________ Number
Full-Cost Firms With Public Debt 16
S u c c e s s f u l - E f f o r t s  Firms With Public Debt 16
Full - Lust. Firms Without Public Debt 57
S u c c e s s f u l - E f f o r t s  Firms Without Public Debt 7U
Firms Changing to Full-Cost 7
Firms Changing to S u c c e s s f u l - E f f o r t s  7
Random samples were drawn from each c a t e g o r y . ^  For 
firms with public debt, ten full-cost and ten successful- 
effoits firms were randomly selected. Thirty full-cost and 
thiity auccesElul efforts firms without public debt were 
randomly chosen. Ten full-cost and ten s u c c e s s f u 1-efforts 
firms without public debt which were in exi s t e n c e  for the 
entire 197 7 through 1986 time period were selected randomly 
in order to compare risk over time. Because of the small 
number of firms changing methods in the population, 
d e s c r i p t i v e  s t a t i s t i c s  for all such firms were examined. 
Debt betas were not measured for firms with market value 
based debt to equity ratios of less than .05, sin c e  these 
firms e f f e c t i v e l y  have no debt, and debt betas are not 
d e f ined  for them. However, these firms were included in 
the s a m ples for tests of the other variables.
^  Appendix A lists the firms included in each sample
category.
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Variables and Hypotheses
The Variables
Four measures of financial risk are analyzed and 
c o m p a r e d  in this study. The measures consist of three 
v ar i a b l e s  representing leverage and a variable repreaenting 
the firm's debt beta.
A. The Leverage Variables - Financial risk is an 
indicator of the p r o bability that a firm will not be able 
to meet the required Interest and principal payments on its 
debt. Therefore, a firm's financial risk usually increases 
as the amount of debt it holds risea. Because of this, 
leverage is often used as a surrogate for financial risk.
Dhalival L1980J tested for d i f f e r e n c e s  in the leverage 
of full-cost versus s u c c e s s f u 1 -efforta firms by comparing  
their debt to equity ratios. S i gnificant d i f f e r e n c e s  in 
leverage were found, but because equity is affected by 
accoun t i n g  method, these d i f f e r e n c e s  could have been due to 
the use of accounting equity in the v a r i a b l e  measuring 
fin a n c i a l  risk. The first variable used in this study is 
the debt to equity ratio using book values, for which the 
r e sults may be compared with previous research. The second 
leverage variable is the debt to equity ratio using the 
market value of equity; the use of this variable elimin a t e s  
the p r oblem of the book value of equity being affected by 
a c c o u n t i n g  method choice.
The third leverage variable, the debt to revenue ratio,
is exa mined because revenue Is not affected by choice of 
full-cost or s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  accounting. This measure 
indicates the d e g r e e  of leverage used to generate the 
firm's level of revenue. For both the debt to revenue 
ratio and the debt to equity ratio using the market value 
of equity, the market values of debt are used for firms 
issuing public debt while the book value of debt is used 
for firms placing only private debt.
B . The Variable Utilizing Betas - The stock bet a , 
also called the equity beta, d e p e n d s  on both the business 
risk of the assets held by the firm and the level of 
financial risk of the firm. Because borrowing while 
m a i ntaining a fixed amount of equity Increases the risk of 
the e q u 1t y h o 1d e r , the beta for the stock of a levered firm 
should be greater than the beta of the stock of an 
o th e r w i s e  identical unlevered firm [Hamada, 19&9], Thus, 
the c o v a r i a n c e  of the levered firm's stock returns with the 
market returns should be greater than the c o v a riance of an 
ot h e r w i s e  identical unlevered firm's returns with market 
ret ur ns.
A firm's asset beta reflects the business risk of the 
firm's existing assets. As the firm Issues debt, its 
common stock b e c omes riskier, thereby increasing the firm's 
equity beta above its asset beta. The d i f f e r e n c e  between 
the firm's equity and asset betas reflects the firm's 
financial risk. This risk increases as debt increases
b3
[Brealey and Myere, 1984, pp. 173-174].
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between a firm's betas was explained 
by Hamada [19bSJ. The system a t i c  risk of a common stock
l  s  :
cov ( R M t *
ft = —      < 1 >
K
w h e r e :
R y t  ^ the c o m m o n  s hareholder ’e rate of return during
pe r i od t ,
Rplt = the rate of return on the market portfolio
during period t.
The s y s t e m a t i c  risk lor the same lirm over the same
period if there were no debt in its capital str u c t u r e  would
be its asset beta:
cov ( R ^ t ' ^ H t *
ft v   — ---    ( 2 )
var ( Rfit 1
w h e r e :
' the rate of return during period t to the
common shareholder if the firm had no debt.
Likewise, the system a t i c  risk of the firm's debt is its 
debt b e t a :
cov <ftD t ' R Mt>
ft =      <3)
1! var ( Rfjt }
w h e r e :
- the rate of return to the debtho l d e r  during
per 1od t .
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An additive r e l a t i o n s h i p  among a firm's betas was 
proven by Hamada 11969 J. The asset beta ma y be represen ted 
as a weighted average of the debt and equity betas. This
r e l a t i o n s h i p  has intuitive appeal. For example, if someone 
were to buy one hundred percent of a c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  debt and 
equity, then that person would own an asset in the form of 
a portfolio of the firm's debt and equity securities. The 
risk of the por t f o l i o  would be a weighted a v erage of the
risk of the debt and equity securities within the
portfolio. The r e l a t i o n s h i p  is r e p resented by the 
following equation L B i e a 1 e y and Myeis, 1984, p. 17 5 J :
debt e q u 11 y
h . i i, + rjj.
debt + equity debt * equity
Solving this equation for the debt beta yields:
debt ♦ equity equity
B = 6 .._________________- Bj, ____________
' debt debt
The firm's equity beta can be computed by examining how 
the price of tne stock has responded in the past to market 
movements. The following regression model used is referred 
to as the stock's c h a r a c t e r l e t i c  line with the market 
port folio [Reilly, 1985, p. 258 1:
R E t = a E + fi E r M t + e t
where:
R Et = the rate of return for stock E during period t,
= the rate of return for the market por t f o l i o
during per iod t ,
bb
= the intercept term of the regression,
B £ = the elope coefficient for the regres s i o n  which
ie equal to Cov ( Rfrf , R ) / var ( ) ,
£  = the random error term during period t.
This is a line of best fit through a scatter plot of rates 
of return for the stock and for the market p o r tfolio of 
stocks over some past time period. This line of best fit 
is relerred to as the market model which was developed by 
Sharpe [ 1964 ] .
The market model when applied empir i c a l l y  is a simple 
linear regres s i o n  model which is estimated in this study 
using the method of least squares. According to the 
Cause Markov theorem, under the c o n d i t i o n s  of the model, 
the least squares estima t o r s  are unbiased and have minimum 
variance among all unbiased linear es t i m a t o r s  [Neter et 
a i . , 198b, p. 3 9 J. The model assumes the following
(Kments, 1966, p. 206 1:
1 ) N o r m a l i t y : 6 t is normally d i s t r 1b u t e d .
2 > Zero Kean: E(£ t ) = G.
3) H o m oskedastlcity: Var < fc ^ ) = a  ^
4 ) N o n a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n : Cov < € * e t 1 =
where s / t.
b) No n a t o c h a s t i c  X: X is a n o n s t o c h a s t l c  variable
with values fixed in repeated samples and such that, for 
any sample size n,
T t X t * "x > 2 / n
b£
le different from zero, and its limit as n approaches  
infinity is a finite number.
The first two assum p t i o n e  state that the d i s t u r b a n c e  ie 
normally d i s t r i b u t e d  around zero for each value of the 
e x p l a n a t o r y  variable. Each value of the distu r b a n c e  may be 
c o n s i d e r e d  as the result of a large number of small causes, 
each cause producing a small de v i a t i o n  of the dependent 
variable from what it would be if the r e l a t i o n s h i p  were 
deterministic. In these circumstances, which are 
r e a s o n a b l e  to assume in this study, assumpt ions of 
normality Bnd zero mean are appro p r i a t e  [K m e n t a , 1966, p .
208-209]. Even if the d i s t u r b a n c e s  are not normally 
dieti i b u t e d , as 1ong as the remaining assumpt ions hold, t>- ■? 
leset squares estima t o r s  of the regres s i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  are 
best linear unbiased e a t i m e t o r s  [K m e n t a , 198b, p. 262].
Finally, with the use of a version of the central limit 
theorem, it can be d e t e r m i n e d  that these e s t i m a t o r s  are 
a s y m p t o t i c a l l y  normal, and that the tests of s i g n i ficance  
involving the regres s i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  are a s y m p t o t i c a l l y  
valid even if the d i s t u r b a n c e s  are not normal, as long as 
the sample size is fairly large IKmenta, 1986, p. 262],
The sample size in this study is fairly large with each 
regres s i o n  utilizing 76 observations.
The third assumption, c o n c e r n i n g  h o m o s k e d a s t i c i t y , 
means that every d i s t u r b a n c e  has the same v a r i a n c e  whose 
value le unknown. This a s s u m p t i o n  is not considered to be
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t r oublesome for models Involving o b s e r v a t i o n s  over short 
time periods, since the values of the e x planatory variable 
(the market return in this study) are typically of the same 
order of ma g n i t u d e  at all points of observation. The same 
is true of the values of the dependent variable (the 
individual stock return in this study). Unless the time 
period covered is very long, the a e s u m p t i o n  of 
homos k e d a e t l e i  ty le plausible CKmenta, 19Q6, p. 269].
The fourth a s s u mption of n o n a u t o c a r r e l a t i o n  is 
r e a s onable in the market model because in an efficient 
market, each obser v a t i o n  of returns is based on information 
availabJe to the market at that time, and is independent of 
previous returns [Copeland and Weston, 1963, pp. 301-305J. 
However, in order to check for autocorrelation, a 
b u r b i n - W a t s o n  test was used. No a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n  was 
present for the firms in this study.
The final assump t i o n  begins with the requirement that 
the values of the e x p l a n a t o r y  variable (the market return 
In this study) be fixed in repeated samples. This
a s s u m p t i o n  c l early is valid in this study. The requirement
_ 2
that £ < X t - X) /n be a finite number different from 
zero means that the values of the expla n a t o r y  variables 
must not be equal to the same number and that they cannot 
approach plus or minus Infinity. This r e q u i r e m e n t  is also 
valid in this study.
1n this study, 76 weekly o b s e r v a t i o n s  were used to
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Estimate the* equity betas. There is no t h eoretically  
correct time period of analysis in using the market model, 
but a trade-off is involved between getting enough 
o b s e r v a t i o n s  and not going so far back in time that the 
parame t e r s  may c h a n g e  over the period tReilly, 1985, p.
253 1. However, in order to reduce the c h a n c e  of having a 
large s ample error, a sample size of greater than ten 
o b s e r v a t i o n s  should be used [Lapin, 1578, p. 319J. The use 
of 78 weekly o b s e r v a t i o n s  satisfies the requiremenr.s of 
being large enough to avoid sampling error, but small 
enough so that the p a r a m e t e r s  would remain relatively 
stable over the time period. An equally weighted index 
using the New York and American stock exc h a n g e s  represented 
the market portfolio. The American stock e x c h a n g e  has 
smaller firms listed on it than f i rms listed on the New 
York exchange. Therefore, use of the equally weighted 
index re c o g n i z e e  the r e t urns for a wider s p e c t r u m  of firms 
over the time per i o d .
An asset beta reflects b u s i n e s s  risk, and is eaual to 
the equity beta of an unlevered firm [Breeley and Myers, 
1984, p. 177]. Therefore, an a v e r a g e  of the equity betas 
for the s p p r o p r i a t e  yeare of firms with no debt may be used 
as a s u r r o g a t e  for an i n d u s t r y - w i d e  asset beta which 
reflects the risk of holding p e t r o l e u m  products. For 
purposes of this study, firms with market value based debt 
to equity ratios of less than .05 were c o n s i d e r e d  ae
b9
e ntiti es with no debt. In most oases, the debt held by 
these firms was in the form of s h o r t - t e r m  trade payables. 
Therefore, for all practical purposes, these are all-equity 
firms. Debt betas for these firms are not defined, so the 
firms were excluded from tests of debt betas. However, the 
leverage variables cauId be measured for these firms, so 
the firms were included in the s a mples in teste of the 
other variables. The all-equity firms are listed by year 
in Appendix B. The i n dustry-wide asset betas for each year 
are in Appendix C.
A major form of business risk in the p e t r o l e u m  industry 
is the v o l a tility of oil prices. Price c h a nges in the 
market reflect this risk. Because all firms in the 
industry face the risk of changing prices, the computed 
asset beta eervee as a good e s t i m a t o r  of the risk of assets 
industrywide. Several empirical s t u dies have found that 
e x t r a c t i v e  industries have strong industry c o m p o n e n t s  in 
their stock mo v e m e n t s  CGaumnitz, 1970; Fleyers, 1979; and 
Livingston, 19771. Therefore, it is r e a s o n a b l e  to assume a 
constant asset beta for the Industry as a whole. This 
asset beta can then be used in the e q u a t i o n  e s t i m a t i n g  the 
firm's debt beta baeed on the weighted d i f f e r e n c e  between 
the equity and asset betas.
The Hypotheses
In order to d e t e r m i n e  whether the firm level of 
financial risk affects the man a g e r ' s  choice of full-cost or
foU
-efforts accounting in the oil and gas Industry, 
four specific research que s t i o n s  are presented:
1> Is the level of financial risk of firms
using the full-cost method higher than that 
of firms using the B u c c e s s f u l -efforts 
met hod ?
2) Do firms which switch to the full-cost 
method e x p e r i e n c e  an increase in financial 
risk prior to the change?
3) Do firms which switch to the succeseful- 
efforte method e x p e r i e n c e  a decrease In 
financial risk prior to the change?
4) l£ the level of financial risk of firms
which do not change methods relatively
stable over time?
Eight hypotheses are presented to answer the research 
questions. In order to address the first specific research 
question, the following null hypotheses are formulated:
HOI: The level of financial risk of firms with
public debt using the s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  
method is at least as great as the financial 
risk level of firms using the full-cost method.
H O i : The level of financial risk of firms with
only private debt using the successful-
efforts method is at least as great as the 
financial risk level of firms using the 
full-cost method.
J Each of the h y p o t h e s e s  1, 4 , and 5 of Chapter One is
split .nto two h y p o t h e s e s  here: one for firms with public
debL ano one lor iirms Wj.cn only pi 1 vate debt. In 
addition, for all hypotheses, the four measures of 
financial risk were tested separately.
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Each of these hypoth e s e s  was tested using a one-tailed  
t-test at the .05 level of significance. Use of the .05 
level of s i g n i f i c a n c e  is consistent with prior research in 
oil and gas accounting CDhaliwal, 1980; Lys, 19041. The 
P values are presented for each test in this study. A 
on e - t a i l e d  test was used in order to det e r m i n e  if financial 
risk was higher for firms using full-cost accounting as is 
sug g e s t e d  by agency theory. Thus, the alt e r n a t e  hypotheses 
state that the financial risk of firms using the full-cost, 
method is higher than that of firms using the successful- 
e f f ort s method. The t-test assumes that the variables are 
normally distributed. To test this normality assumption, a 
S h a pir o Wilks test was utilized since the sample sizes were 
less than 51 [SAS, 1905, p. 1107]. In cases in which the
variables were not normally distributed, one-tailed
Wilcoxon sum - r a n k s  tests, which is the nonpara m e t r i c  
e quiva l e n t  of the t-test for group means, were employed 
LLapin, 1970, pp. b20-6231.
To a d d ress the second specific research question, the
following null h y p o t h e s i s  is formulated:
H 0 3 : The level of financial risk, preceding
the time of the change, of firms 
s wi t c h i n g  to the full-cost accounting 
method dec r e a s e s  or is stable.
Because the p o p u l a t i o n  of firms swi t c h i n g  to the 
full-cost a c c o u n t i n g  method within the time period 
c on s i s t e d  of only seven firms (all with only privately 
placed debt), no s t a tistical teste were performed for these
companies. However, d e s c r i p t i v e  s t a t i s t i c s  we r e  o b t a i n e d
lor each financial risk variable for both one year and five 
years preceding the accounting method change.
The third research question is ad d r e s s e d  U B l n g  the 
lolloving null hypothesis:
H Q 4 : The level of financial riBk, preceding
the time of the change, of firms 
swi t c h i n g  to the s u c c e s s f u 1 -efforts 
a c c o unting method increases or is 
stable.
Ae before, because the population of com p a n i e s  with 
only p rivately placed debt which switched to the 
s u c c e s s J u 1 -e f forte method of accoun t i n g  during the test 
period con s i s t e d  of only seven firms, no statistical tests 
were p erformed for tins hypothesis. Instead, descr i p t i v e  
s t a t i s t i c s  were obtained for the popula t i o n  on each 
financial risk v a r i a b l e  for both one year and five yearB 
preceding the time of the accoun t i n g  method change.
To a d dress the fourth specific research gueetion, the 
following null h y p o t h e s e s  are formulated:
HQ 5: T h e r e  i s  n o  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  l e v e l  o f
f i n a n c i a l  r i s k  o v e r  t i m e  l o r  f i r m s  w i t h  
p u b l i c  d e b t ,  w h e r e  t h e  f i r m s  u s e  t h e  f u l l -  
c o s t  m e t h o d  ( a n d  t h u s  h a v e  n o t  s w i t c h e d  
a c c o u n t  i n g  m e t h o d s ) .
HOfc. : T h e r e  i s  n o  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  l e v e l  o f
f i n a n c i a l  r i s k  o v e r  t i m e  f o r  f i r m s  w i t h  
o n l y  p r i v a t e  d e b t ,  w h e r e  t h e  f i r m s  u s e  t h e  
f u l l - c o s t  m e t h o d  ( a n d  t h u s  h a v e  n o t  s w i t c h e d  
a c c o u n t i n g  m e t h o d s ) .
H 0 7 : T h e r e  i s  n o  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  l e v e l  o f
f i n a n c i a l  r i s k  o v e r  t i m e  f o r  f i r m s  w i t h  
p u b l i c  d e b t ,  w h e r e  t h e  f i r m s  u s e  t h e  
s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t e  m e t h o d  ( a n d  t h u s  h a v e
S3
r.ot switched accounting methods).
HOfl: There is no d i f f e r e n c e  In the level of
financial risk over time for f 1 r ttib with only 
private debt, where the firms use the 
s u c c e s s f u 1 -efforte method (and thus, have 
not switched accoun t i n g  methods).
Each separate measure of financial risk for these firms 
was matched for the years 1977 and 1906. A m a tched-pairs  
two-tailed t-test was used to test each null h y p o thesis at
t t^ e .05 level of slgnlf i c a n e e . A Wilcoxon matched - p a l r s 
two tailed signed ranks test was employed instead when the 
variables proved not to be normally distributed through use 
of the S h a piro Wilks test.
Summer y
Agency theory suggests that managers of firms with high 
levels of financial risk will choose accounting methods 
that increase net income and net tangible assets, because 
these methods will decrease the p o s sibility of technical 
default on loan covenants. The proced u r e s  described in 
this chapter are designed to test whether the behavior of 
co r p o r a t e  managers in the oil and gas Industry is 
consistent with agency theory.
CH A PTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the data and the statistical 
tests used in the study to d e t e r m i n e  the effect of 
financial risk on the man a g e r ' s  choice of full-cost or 
s u c c e s s f u 1-efforts accounting in the oil and gas industry. 
The first section of this chapter d i s c u s s e s  the formu l a t i o n  
of the variables. The next s e c tion reports on the tests of 
the hypotheses, and finally, a summary of the results is 
p r e s e n t e d .
The Formu l a t i o n  of the V a riables 
The Debt to Revenue Ratio
For firms holding public debt, the market value of that 
debt was d e t e r m i n e d  as of the last day of the year for 
which the variable was being measured. This infor m a t i o n
was ob tained from Moody's Bond R e c o r d . The book value of 
debt was used for firms with only p r i vate debt. To 
for m u l a t e  the ratio, total firm r e v enue was used for the 
year being measured.
The Debt tr Equity Ratio
For the debt to equity ratio using market values, the 
market val u e  of the debt of firms holding public debt was 
d e t e r m i n e d  as of the last day of the year for which the
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rat i o  was being measured. The book value of debt was used 
for firms with only p r i vate debt. The market value of
equity for each firm was d e t e r m i n e d  as of the last day of
the year for which the m e asurement was taken. The stock
prices were taken from the Wall Street Journal and the
number of shares o u t s t a n d i n g  was obtained from the firms' 
l O K s .  Book values of debt and equity were used for the 
ratio utilizing book values.
The Debt Beta
In order to derive a firm's debt beta, both that firm's 
equity beta and the industry's asset beta had to be 
determined. The weighted d i f f e r e n c e  between the asset and 
equity betas resulted in an e s t i m a t i o n  of the debt beta.
A. The E q u 11 y Beta - Each firm's equity beta was 
d e t e r m i n e d  by regres s i n g  that firm's weekly returns against 
the weekly market returns for the 78 week period ending 
with the final week in December of the year for which the 
m e a s u r e m e n t  was being taken. An equally weighted index of 
the New York and American Stock e x c h a n g e s  was used to 
represent the market portfolio. To test for
autocorrelation, a D u r b i n -Watson test was per f o r m e d  on each 
regression. The results r e v e a l e d  that no a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n  
was present for the sa m p l e  firms in the years measured.
B. The Asset Beta - An industry asset beta was 
es t i m a t e d  for each year in the study by taking an average 
of the equity bet a s  for that year of the firms determined
bL
to be all equity firms. An aeset beta for each year from
197 7 through 198b was needed because of their use in 
estima t i n g  the debt betas of firms changing methods. Debt 
betas were obtained for these change firms for both one 
year and five years preceding the method change, resulting 
in the necessity of an asset beta for each year in the 
study.
C. The Debt Beta - The debt betas were derived using 
the following formula:
debt ■* equity equity
f) M debt ' debt
The equity betas for each firm and the asset betas foi
the industry estimated from above were utilized for the 
periods being tested. In the equation, market values of 
debt were used for firms holding public debt by taking the 
market value of that debt for the last day of the year for
which the estima t i o n  of the debt beta was being made. The
book values of debt were used lor firms that had only
private debt. The market values of equity were used in the 
e stima t i o n  equation for each sample firm by taking the 
market value of the firm's equity as of the last day of the 
year for which the debt beta e s t i m a t e  was being made.
Thus, ari estimate of the debt beta was d e rived for each 
sample firm except for all-eq u i t y  firms for each year being
tested. Debt betas are not defined for firms with no debt,
so debt betas were not d e rived for these firms.
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Tests of the H y p o t h e s e s
H y p o t h e s i s  1
The first hypothesis Is designed to d e t e r m i n e  If the 
financial risk level of s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  firms with 
public debt Is as least as great as the financial risk 
level of full-cost firms with public debt (each financial 
risk variable being tested separately). Group means of the 
1986 risk levels for each variable were compared for ten 
randomly selected firms using each a c c o unting method. To 
test for the normality assumption, the S h a p i r o - W i I k s  test 
was used. This test s t a tistic showed that the null 
h y p o t h e s i s  of a normal d i s t r i b u t i o n  was rejected at the .05 
level of s i g n i f i c a n c e  for each financial risk variable. 
Therefore, Wilcoxon rank sum tests were performed on each 
risk variable. The hypothesis was rejected at the .05 
level of s i g n i f i c a n c e  for both the debt to equity ratio 
using the book value of equity, and for the debt to revenue 
ratio. The group means for each variable and summary 
s t a t i s t i c s  for the tests are p r e sented in Table 1. 
H y p o t h e s i s  2
This h y p o t h e s i s  is d e s i g n e d  to d e t e r m i n e  if the 
financial risk level of s u c c e s s ! u l - e f f o r t s  firms with only 
private debt is as least as great as the financial risk 
level of full-cost firms with only p r ivate debt (each 
financial risk variable b e i n g  tested separately). Group 
means of the 1986 risk v a r i a b l e s  were c o m p a r e d  for thirty
TABLE 1 
HYPOTHESIS ONE 
TESTS OF FINANCIAL RISK VARIABLES 
OF FULL-COST AND SUCCESSFUL-EFFORTS FIRMS 
ISSUING PUBLIC DEBT
Level of 
Significance 
for a
Va r .
G r o u p
SE
Means
FC
T e s t
P e r f o r m e d
C r i t i c a l
V a l u e
O n e - T a i l e d
T e s t
R e j e c
Hypoth i
D/E bk 1. 9 4 8 4 6 . 6 9 4 9 W i l c o x o n Z = l . 9 6 5 . 0 2 4 7 Yes
D/E a k t 2 . 0 5 4 7 4 . B545 W i l c o x o n Z= . 6 3 2 . 2 0 2 3 No
D/R 1 . 6 1 6 6 3 . 2 9 0 4 W i l c o x o n Z= 3. 024 . 0 0 1 3 Yes
B e t a . 72B4 . 7 0 5 8 W i l c o x o n Z = l .  134 . 1284 No
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randomly selected firms using each accounting method. To 
test for the normality assumption, the S h a p i r o - W i I k s  test 
was used. This test sta t i s t i c  showed that the null 
h y p o t h e s i s  of a normal d i s t r i b u t i o n  was rejected at the .OS 
level of s i g n i f i c a n c e  for each variable. Therefore, 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests weie performed for all variables. 
T h ese tests resulted in re j e c t i o n  of the null hypothesis 
at the .05 level of s i g n i f i c a n c e  for only the debt to 
revenue variable. However, the debt to equity variable 
using the book value of equity was bo r d e r l i n e  to rejection, 
with a P-value of .0585. Group means for each variable and 
summary s t a t i s t i c s  for the tests are presented in Table 2. 
Hypoth e e i a  J
The purpose of this h y p o t h e s i s  Is to det e r m i n e  if the 
financial risk level of firms changing to the full-cost 
a c c o u n t i n g  method d e c r e a s e s  or is stable prior to the 
change. Because the p o p u lation of firms changing to the 
full-cost method during the test period con s i s t e d  of only 
seven co m p a n i e s  (each with only pri v a t e l y  placed debt), 
d e s c r i p t i v e  s t a t i s t i c s  on the e n t i r e  popula t i o n  were 
obtained. These s t a t i s t i c s  are presented in Table 3. 
H y p o t h e s i s  4
This h y p o t h e s i s  is d e s i g n e d  to d e t e r m i n e  if the 
financial risk level of firms changing to the successful- 
e f forts a c c o u n t i n g  method increases or is stable preceding 
the time of the change. The popula t i o n  of firms with
TABLE 2 
HYPOTHESIS TWO 
TESTS OF FINANCIAL RISK VARIABLES 
OF FULL-COST AND SUCCESSFUL-EFFORTS FIRMS 
PLACING ONLY PRIVATE DEBT
Group Means T e s t
Var . SE FC P e r f o r m e d
D/E bk . 9949 5 . 7 1 5 1 W i l c o x on
D/E mkt 2 . 0 8 5 5 2.  5486 W i l c o x o n
D/R 1 . 8 5 3 4 2 . 6 2 6 3 W i l c o x o n
B e t a . 9 5 0 8 . 8533 W i l c o x on
L e v e l  o f  
Signi f icance
f o r  a
C r i t i c a l  O n e - T a i l e d  R e j e c t
V a l u e _____________T e s t _________ H y p o t h e s i s
Z = 1 . 5 6 7  . 0 5 8 5  No
Z=1 . 5 1 5  . 0 6 4 8  No
Z = 2 . 0 2 5  . 0 2 1 4  Yes
Z= . 2 8 2  . 3 8 9 0  No
TABLE 3 
HYPOTHESIS THREE 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF 
FINANCIAL RISK VARIABLES OF PIRNS 
CHANGING TO FULL-COST ACCOUNTING
I n c r e a s e  P e r c e n t  
5 Y e a r s  B e f o r e  C h a n g e  1 Y e a r  B e f o r e  C h a n g e  ( D e c r e a s e )  I n c r e a s e
V a r i a b l e Mean S t d .  D e v i a t i o n Mean S t d -  D e v i a t i o n i n  Nean ( D e c r e a s e )
D/E bk 2.  3 2 1 9 2 . 3 0 4 8 1 . 4 2 5 9 . 6 9 2 3 < , 8 9 6 0 ) ( 3 8 . 5 97 . )
D/E mkt . 2 9 4 2 . 1517 . 8 1 6 9 . 4 5 6 3 . 5 2 2 7 1 77 . 69 %
D/R 1 . 8 1 3 4 . 7 2 8 9 1. 6 3 7 3 . 72 73 ( . 1 7 6 1 ) ( 9.71V.)
B e t a . 6 6 6 4 . 6 8 7 1 1. 7 3 9 3 . 9 1 9 0 1. 0 7 2 9 160.  99V.
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private debt and changing to the s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t a  method 
during the test period con s i s t e d  of seven companies.
Because of the small number of firms in the population, 
d e s c r i p t i v e  statistics were obtained and presented for the 
en t i r e  population. These statis t i c s  are presented in Table
4.
H y p o t h e s i s  5
This hypoth e s i s  re designed to de t e r m i n e  if the risk 
level of firms with public debt and which maintain use of 
the full-cost accounting method remains constant over 
time. The risk levels of these firms for the year 1977 
were matched to their risk levels for the year 198fc for 
each financial risk variable. A Sh a p i r o - W i l k s  teBt 
revealed that only the debt to revenue ratio and the debt 
beta were normally distr i b u t e d  at the .05 level of 
e i g n l f l c a n c e . A two-tailed m a t c h e d -peira t-teet was used
for these variables. Two-ta i l e d  Wilcoxon m a t c h e d -pairs 
s i g n e d - r a n k s  teste were used for the remaining risk 
variables. The h y p o t h e s i s  of no change over time in risk 
levels was rejected only for the debt to equity ratio using 
the book values. Group means for each variable and summary 
s t a t i s t i c s  are presented in Table 5.
H y p o t h e s i s  6
The p u r p o s e  of this h y p o t h e s i s  is to det e r m i n e  il the 
financial risk level of firms with only private debt and 
which use the full-cost method remains constant over time.
TABLE 4 
HYPOTHESIS FOUR 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF 
FINANCIAL RISK VARIABLES OF FIRHS 
CHANGING TO SUCCESSFUL- EFFORTS ACCOUNTING
I n c r e a s e  P e r c e n t  
5 Y e a r s  B e f o r e  C h a n g e  1 Y e a r  B e f o r e  C h a n g e  ( D e c r e a s e )  I n c r e a s e
V a r i a b l e Mean S t d .  D e v i a t i o n Kean S t d .  D e v i a t i o n i n  K e a n s ( D e c r e a s e
D/E bk 1. 1976 1 . 2 2 4 1 1 . 5 2 1 6 1 . 0 3 1 8 . 3 2 4 0 2 7 . 05X
D/E mkt . 8 5 5 0 1 . 1 2 0 4 1. 6 4 9 0 . 9 4 1 6 . 7 9 4 0 9 2 . 8 7 X
D/R . 9 4 3 7 . 6 6 0 3 5 . 9 2 2 3 8.  8 8 3 6 4 . 9 7 8 6 5 2 7 . 56X
B e t a 1. 7 5 2 5 1. 5 9 9 8 1. 7 5 5 9 . 6 4 0 6 . 0 0 3 4 . 19X
TABLE 5 
HYPOTHESIS FIVE 
TESTS OF FINANCIAL RISK VARIABLES 
OVER TIME
OF FULL-COST FIRMS ISSUING PUBLIC DEBT
Level of 
Significance 
for a
V e r .
G ro u p
77
Means
86
T e B t
P e r f o r m e d
C r i t i c a l
V a l u e
T w o - T a i l e d
T e a t
Re j e c  
Hypoth i
D/E bk 3. 2 6 0 9 7 . 0 5 5 4 W i l c o x o n Z = l . 6 8 2 . 0 4 6 3 Yes
D/E mkt 5 . 9 6 7 9 4 . 8 5 4 5 W i l c o x o n Z = l . 784 . 0 7 4 4 No
D/R 1 . 6 1 7 4 3. 3004 T - t e s t 7 = 1 . 2 0 0 . 2 4 5 4 No
B e t a . 5 2 1 2 . 7 8 6 4 T - t e s t T = . 7 0 4 . 4 9 9 2 No
The risk levels of these firms were matched for the years 
1977 and 1986 for each financial risk variable. The 
Sh a p i r o - M i I k s  test revealed that only the debt beta 
variable was normally d i s t r i b u t e d  at the .05 level of 
significance. A two-tailed m a t c h e d - pairs t-teat was used 
for the debt beta variable. Two-ta i l e d  Wilcoxon 
m a t c h e d -palrs slgn e d - r a n k e  tests w^re performed for the 
remaining variables. The tests resulted in rejection of 
the h ypothesis of no change in risk levels at the .05 level
of s i g n i f i c a n c e  only for the debt to equity ratio using
market values. Group means for the variables and summary
s t a t i s t i c s  are presented in Table &.
H y p otheai o 7
This h y p o thesis is designed to d e t ermine if the 
financial risk level of firms with public debt and which 
maintain the use of s u c c e e s f u 1 -efforts a c c o unting remains 
constant over time. The financial risk var i a b l e s  were 
matched for the years 1977 and 1986 for the sample firms. 
The S h a p i r o -W i 1ks test revealed that none of the variables 
were normally d i s t r i b u t e d  at the .05 level of 
significance. Therefore, two-tailed Wilcoxon matched- 
pairs s i g n e d - r a n k s  test were performed. The h y p o t h e s i s  of 
no ch a n g e  was rejected at the .05 level of sign i f i c a n c e  
only for the debt beta variable. Group means and summary 
st a t i s t i c s  are presented in Table 7.
TABLE 6 
HYPOTHESIS SIX 
TESTS OF FINANCIAL RISK VARIABLES 
OVER TIME
OF FULL-COST FIRMS PLACING ONLY PRIVATE DEBT
L e v e l  o f  
S i g n i f i c a n c e  
f o r  a
V a r .
G r o u p
77
HeanB
86
T e s t
P e r f o r m e d
C r i t i c a l
V a l u e
T w o - T a i l e d
T e s t
R e j e c
H ypoth i
D/E bk . 6 5 2 9 2. 3 9 7 2 W i l c o x o n Z= . 9 6 8 . 1664 No
D/E » k t . 2 7 7 0 4 . 6 5 3 1 W i l c o x o n Z = 2.  191 . 0 2 8 4 Yes
D/R 1 . 8 9 6 7 2 . 8 7 9 7 W i l c o x o n Z = l . 172 . 2 4 1 2 No
B e t a 1 . 2 4 8 2 . 6 1 5 0 T - t e s t T= . 5 4 2 . 6 0 7 4 No
TABLE 7 
HYPOTHESIS SEVEN 
TESTS OF FINANCIAL RISK VARIABLES 
OVER TIME
OF SlICCESSFUL-EFFORTS FIRMS ISSUING PUBLIC DEBT
L e v e l  o f  
S i g n i f i c a n c e  
f o r  a
V a r .
G r o u p
77
H e an e
86
T e s t
P e r f o r m e d
C r i t i c a l
V a l u e
T w o - T a i l e d
T e s t
Re j e c  
Hypo th i
D/E bk 1 . 1 9 7 6 1 . 9 4 8 4 W i l c o x o n Z = l . 478 . 0 6 9 7 No
D/E mkt . 9 2 9 3 2 . 0 5 4 7 W i l c o x o n Z = l . 58 0 . 1142 No
D/R . 6 5 0 4 1 . 6 1 6 6 W i l c o x o n Z = l . 47 8 . 1394 No
B e t a 1 . 6 3 3 9 . 7 2 8 4 W i l c o x o n Z = 2. 6 0 0 . 0 0 9 3 Yes
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H ypoth e s i s  B
This h y p o t h e s i s  is designed to test it the financial 
risk level of firms with only private debt and which 
maintain the use of a u c c e a e f u l - e f f o r t e  accoun t i n g  remains 
conetant over time. The financial risk variables were 
matched for the years 1977 and 1906 for the sample firms. 
The S h a p i r o - W i I k s  test revealed that none of the v a riables  
were normally d i s t r i b u t e d  at the .05 level of
significance. Therefore, two-ta i l e d  Wilcoxon ma t c h e d - p a l r e  
signed ranks tests were performed. The hypoth e s i s  failed 
to be rejected at the .05 level of s i g n i f i c a n c e  for all 
variables. Group means and summary statistics are 
presented in Table 8.
D iscus s i o n  of the Reeults 
H y p o t h e s e s One and Two
The first two hypoth e s e s  are designed to test if the 
level of financial n e k  of e u c c e e e f u l - e f f o r t e  firms is ae 
least as great as that of full-cost firms. The debt to 
r e venue ratio was found to be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  greater for 
full-cost firms both with and without public debt. The 
finding regarding the debt to r e venue rat i o  is consistent 
with previous research per f o r m e d  by Deakin [19791 in which 
it was found that the debt to r e venue ratios of full-cost 
firms were higher than those of s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  firms.
The debt to equity r a tio utilizing book values was 
found to be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  greater for full-cost firms 
issuing public debt, but not for full-cost firms placing
TABLE 8 
HYPOTHESIS EIGHT 
TESTS OF FINANCIAL RISK VARIABLES 
OVER TIME
OF SUCCESSFUL-EFFORTS FIRMS PLACING ONLY PRIVATE DEBT
L e v e l  o f  
S i g n i f i c a n c e  
f o r  a
V a r .
G r o u p
77
Means
66
T e s t
P e r f o r m e d
C r i t i c a l
V a l u e
T w o - T a i l e d
T e s t
R e j e c t
H y p o t h e s i s
D/E bk . 6 5 1 6 2. 0 2 6 5 W i l c o x o n 2= . 5 6 1 . 2 8 7 5 No
D/E mkt . 3 1 9 6 . 5 9 8 3 W i l c o x o n 2 = 1 . 8 8 6 . 0 5 9 4 No
D/R . 9 0 1 0 1 . 0 7 5 8 W i l c o x o n Z= . 8 6 6 . 3 8 6 2 No
B e t a 1 . 2 6 1 8 . 9 0 6 5 W i l c o x o n 2= . 6 7 4 . 5 0 0 2 No
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only private debt. This result is partially consistent 
with prior research which found that the debt to equity 
ratios of full-cost firms tend to be higher than those of 
s u c c e s s ! u l -efforte firms [Dhellwal, 1980; Lillen and 
Fastens, 1982]. However, in this study, the 1-value of 
.058b for firms placing only private debt indicates that 
the hy pothesis was close * o being rejected at the .05 level 
of significance. The mean of the variable for full-cost 
iirms was 5.7151 which is quite higher than the mean of 
.9949 for s u c c e s e f u 1 -e f forts firms.
Thus, to the extent of the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d  variables, 
the results of this study are generally consistent with 
prior research. Whatever i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  remain in this 
regard may result from the different time periods used. 
Dhaliwal [1980) used 1978 as the year for which the test 
for diffe r e n c e s  was performed, whereas Lilien and Pastena 
[1982J used 1978 as the test year. These years were 
periods of generally high explo r a t i o n  activities, 
e s p e c i a l l y  in c o m p a r i s o n  to 1988, the year used in this 
study, which was g e n e r a l l y  a period of low e x p l o r a t i o n  
activities. The use of full-cost or s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  
accoun t i n g  affects the book value of equity, and this 
effect b e comes more pronounced as e x p l o r a t i o n  activities  
increase due to the c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  of u n s u c cessful  
ex p l o r a t o r y  wells under the full-cost accoun t i n g  method.
In this study, for both firms with and without public
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debt, the hypotheses failed to be rejected when using the 
debt beta vailable. Therefore, it cannot be co n c l u d e d  that 
the debt betas of full-cost firms are higher than those of 
success!' u 1 - ef f or t s firms. This is consistent with agency 
theory which would predict that firms facing increases in 
risk have incent i v e s  to switch to full-cost accounting, but 
firms m a intaining methods over fairly long time periods may 
not exhibit differences in risk levels.
H y p o t h e s i s  T h r e e
The p u rpose of this hypoth e s i s  is to det e r m i n e  if the 
financial risk levels of firms changing to the full-cost 
accoun t i n g  method decrease or are stable prior to the 
change. The group means reveal that the debt to equity 
ratio using mar ket values and the debt beta variable 
increased prior to the change. This is consis t e n t  with 
agency theory which would predict that as a firm's 
financial risk increases, the management of that firm may 
switch to use the full-cost method of accoun t i n g  in order 
to avoid technical default on loan covenants.
The debt to equity r a tio utilizing book values and the 
debt to r e venue r a tio de c r e a s e d  prior to the change. The 
amount of debt held by these firms gen e r a l l y  increased 
prior to the change, but not proport ionately as great as 
the increase in r e v enue and the book value of equity. The 
standard de v i a t i o n  of the debt to equity variable utilizing 
book values for the fifth year preceding the c h a n g e  is
62
large due to a wide range of ratio values for the small
number of firms examined.
□thesis Four 
This h y p o t h e s i s  is designed to d e t e r m i n e  if the 
financial risk level of firms changing to the successful-
efforts accoun t i n g  method increases or is stable prior to
the chenge. Agency theory gen e r a l l y  predicts a d e c r e a s e  In 
the financial risk levels of these firms prior to the 
change. E x a m i n a t i o n  of the means of the var i a b l e s  for both 
one year and five years preceding the c h a n g e  reveals that 
all of the risk va r i a b l e s  except the debt beta Increased 
prior to the change. The most s i g nificant di f f e r e n c e  is 
found in the debt to revenue ratio. The debt beta variable  
remained constant. These results indicate that the firms 
were not prompted to change by d e c r e a s e s  in financial 
risk. Other factors must have c o n t r i b u t e d  to the decis i o n  
to change methods. One such factor could be the ease of 
r e c o r d k e e p i n g  when using s u c c e s e f u 1-ef f orts accounting.
The standard de v i a t i o n s  for these variables is large due to 
a wide r a nge of values for the va r i a b l e s  and the small 
number of firms examined.
H y p o t h e s e s  Five and Six
The p u r pose of these hypoth e s e s  is to d e t e r m i n e  if the 
financial risk levels of ful l - c o s t  firms which do not 
switch a c c o u n t i n g  methods remain constant over time.
Agency theory would predict, ceteris paribus, that the risk 
levels of these firms should not change. The results for
£13
the moat part were consistent with agency theory. The only 
significant changes in risk were found for the debt to 
equity ratio using book values of firms with public debt 
and for the debt to equity ratio using market values of 
ill'ms with only private debt. Based on exami n a t i o n  of the 
means, both of these ratios were found to increase. These 
increases were due to a general decrease in both the book 
value and market value of the equity of these firms over 
the time period.
H ypoth e s e s  Seven and Eight
These hypotheses are designed to determine if the 
financial risk levels of e u c c e s e f u 1 -efforts firms which do 
not switch methods remain constant over time. Agency 
theory would predict, c e teris paribus, that the financial 
risk levels of these firms should not change 
significantly. The results were consistent with agency 
theory with one exception. This exception was for the debt 
beta of firms issuing public debt, which changed over the 
period. E x a m i n a t i o n  of the means for each year indicates 
that the debt beta dec r e a s e d  from 1977 to 19Q6. The firms 
in this sample are, for the most part, the largest firms 
tested in this study. Eight of the ten firms in the sample 
are major integrated oil companies. Prior research hee 
c o n s i d e r e d  the largest t w enty-four oil and gas e n t i t i e s  as 
the major i n t e grated oil c o m p a n i e s  (Deakin, 1979; Dhaliwal, 
1980J. The eight major integr a t e d  firms included in this
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s ample may have e x p e r i e n c e d  a decrease in financial risk 
due to further d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  e f forts during the 197 7 to 
1988 per i o d .
Summary of the Results
In conelusion, the financial risk levels of full-cost 
firms generally were found not to be higher than those of 
s u c c e s s ! u 1 -efforts firms. Firms changing to the full-cost 
method e x p e r i e n c e d  increases in their debt betas prior to 
the change, while no dec r e a s e s  in the risk v a r iables were 
present for the firms switching to s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  
accounting. Instead, for firms swi t c h i n g  to the 
successful e f f orts method, fairly large increases were 
found in the debt to equity ratio and in the debt to 
revenue ratio, although the debt beta was stable. Fui Lhe 
most part, the financial risk levels of firms which did not 
cha n g e  accounting methods could not be dis c e r n e d  to be 
other than stable over the period.
Firms which switched to full-cost accounting  
e x p e r i e n c e d  a s u b s t a n t i a l  increase in their debt betas 
prior to the change. This may suggest that a change in the 
market a s s e ssment of financial risk may be a significant 
factor in the d e c i s i o n  to change accoun t i n g  methods. The 
extent of a firm's leverage, however, does not appear to be 
a factor in the ch a n g e  decision. Firms which do not change 
methods gen e r a l l y  cannot be said to have significant 
d i f f e r e n c e s  in leverage or market assessed risk over time.
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The exception 1b for the debt betas of firms with public 
debt which maintained use of the s u c c e s s f u l - e f £orts 
a c c o unting method. These firms' debt betas were shown to 
decrease over time. This may be because of further 
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  of these Integrated companies. That the 
beta variable did not always behave in the same manner as 
the leverage variables suggests that there may be 
d i f f e r e n c e s  between using leverage as an indicator of risk, 
and a market assessment of risk. The market apparently may 
consider other factors in addition to leverage in assessing 
a firm's financial risk level.
C H APTER 5
SUMMARY AND C O N C L U S I O N S
This chapter presents the summary and the major 
imp l i c a t i o n s  of the research study. The chapter begins 
with a summary of the research. Next, the i m p l i cations of 
the findings of the study are discussed, followed by a 
section outlining the l i mitations of the study. Finally, 
some sugg e s t i o n s  for future research are presented.
Summa r y
The full-cost method of accounting was introduced in 
the mid-1950s, and by 1970, ap p r o x i m a t e l y  one-half of all 
publicly held oil and gas pro d u c e r s  had adopted this method 
[Dehne, 1983, p. 551. The Exposure Draft of SFAS 19 was 
issued in 1977 which proposed to eli m i n a t e  the full-cost 
accoun t i n g  method. This caused an outcry from Independent 
pr o d u c e r s  who claimed that a switch to the successful- 
ef forts a c c o u n t i n g  method would impair their ability to 
raise capital. The full-cost method is still accepted 
today, but this same type of outcry was once again voiced 
in 1988 when the SEC c o n s i d e r e d  a b o l i s h i n g  the full-cost 
method.
Agency th eory can be used to e x plain the o p p o s i t i o n  to
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the abolishment of full-cost accounting. Full-cost firms 
which oppose the abo l i t i o n  of full-cost a c c o u n t i n g  may have 
debt c o v e n a n t s  with p r o v i s i o n s  based on a c c o u n t i n g  numbers 
with r e ference to GAAP. In technical default, a m e n d m e n t s  
need to be made to the debt covenants, and these amendments  
are costly to secure. Therefore, agency theory predicts 
that m a n a g e r s  of firms with high financial risk will prefer 
to use a c c o u n t i n g  methods which increase net tangible 
assets and income. The full-cost method tends to increase 
net tangible assets and provides for a more stable net 
i ncome.
However, when dealing with the oil and gas industry, 
b a nkers do not consider the ratio p r o v i s i o n s  of debt 
c o v e n a n t s  as being important, but Instead are concerned 
with r eserves reports. Therefore, leverage may not be an 
a p p r o p r i a t e  s u r r o g a t e  for financial risk in the oil and gas 
industry where it is found that bankers c o n s i d e r  other 
f a c tors as being more important than ratios in assessing 
financial risk.
The focal point of this study was to d e t e r m i n e  if the 
level ol firm financial risk a f f e c t s  the m a n a g e r ' s  choice 
of full-cost or s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  ac c o u n t i n g  in the oil 
and gas Industry. Past s t udies in this area had all used 
l e v e r a g e  as a s u r r o g a t e  for f i nancial risk tDeakln, 1979; 
DhBliwal, 1980; F o s t e r , 1980; L i 1ien and Pastena, 1982; and
Johnson and Ramanan, 1988]. The debt beta, a vari a b l e
8£1
measuring a market assessment of risk, was introduced in 
this study. The market c o n s i d e r s  other factors besides 
leverage in assessing financial risk, and these other 
factors are ref l e c t e d  in the debt bet a . Three leverage 
variables were also included in the study as measures of 
financial riBk: the debt to equity ratio using book values,
the debt to equity ratio using market values, and the debt 
to revenue ratio.
Thus study sought to answer four Bpecific questions.
The first question dealt with d e t e r m i n i n g  if the financial 
risk of n o n c h a n g i n g  full-cost firms is higher than that of 
nonchang 1 rig s u cces s f u 1 - e f f or t s firms. The only variable 
found to be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  higher lor both full-cost firms 
issuing public debt and full-cost firms placing only 
private debt was the debt to r e venue ratio. This variable 
is, however, q u e s t i o n a b l e  as a m e asure of capital 
structure. The debt to equity ratio is a clearer indicator 
of the firm's use of leverage because the use of equity in 
the denominator lias a more direct r e l a t i o n s h i p  with capital 
str u c t u r e  than revenue. The debt beta of full-cost firms 
was not found to be higher than the debt beta of 
s u c c e s s f u 1 - e l f orte firms. Therefore, it cannot be 
con c l u d e d  that leverage or llnancial risk of full-cost 
firms is greater than that of s u c c e s s f u l -e f f orte firms.
The second q u e s t i o n  dealt with d e t e r m i n i n g  if firms
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switching tu use full-cost accounting e x p e r i e n c e  an
increase in financial risk prior to the change. It was
d e t e r m i n e d  that the debt betas, which ar*=- the market 
assessment of risk, did Increase prior to the change. The 
debt to equity ratio utilizing market values also increased 
prior to the change.
The next question dealt with d e t e r m i n i n g  if the 
financial risk levels of firms c h a n g i n g  to the succeseful- 
efforts method d e c r e a s e  prior to the change. None of the 
variables su b s t a n t i a l l y  dec r e a s e d  prior to the change. 
Instead, the leverage variables increased, with the most 
s u bstantial increase being in the debt to revenue ratio, 
while the debt bet a remained constant.
The final question was to d e t e r m i n e  if the risk levels 
of firms which do not change methods remain relatively  
stable over time. In general, it could not be concluded 
that these risk levels changed over the test period. An 
exc e p t i o n  was for the debt betas of s u c c e s s f u 1-efforts 
firms with public debt. These firms' debt betas decreased 
over the time period. This could be due to further
The findings of this research may be useful to both the 
FA SB and the SEC. The debt beta, which is the market 
assess m e n t  of financial risk, a p p ears to be a relevant
o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  f i r m s
included in this sample.
The Imp l i c a t i o n s
St'
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  in the decision to change accoun t i n g  methods 
when s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  firms switch to use the fuii-cost 
method. The method change does not appear to be due to 
auditor pressure since only three of the fourteen firms 
which c h anged methods switched auditors in the five years 
preceding the method change. These c h anges involved "Big 
tight" firms having clients using both methods. The 
rel e v a n c e  ol financial risk to the decision to change to 
full-cost accounting could explain why firms which 
a n t i c i p a t e  possible increases in financial risk would 
oppose e l i m i n a t i o n  of the full-cost method. However, other 
firms opposing e l i m i n a t i o n  of the full-cost method must 
have other reasons for their opposition. These reasons 
could include a r e s i s t a n c e  to the reduction of accounting 
options, the effect of the change on reported net income, 
and the effect of the change on management compensation.
This study also has agency theory implications. The 
findings of this study are consis t e n t  with agency theory in 
that firms which c h anged to full-cost a c c o u n t i n g  had 
increases in their debt betas prior to the change. Agency 
theory p r e d i c t s  that firms with increa s i n g  financial risk 
may tend to change to the full-cost method in order to 
avoid technical default on their loan covenants. Agency 
theory g e n e r a l l y  predicts a decrease, prior to the change, 
in the financial risk of firms switching to the 
succes s f u l  e f forts method. The results of this study,
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however, do  not s u p p o r t  t h i s  claim.
For firms m a intaining the use of one method, it could 
not be con c l u d e d  that the debt betas for full-cost firms 
exceed those for s u c c e s s f u 1 -efforts firms. This finding is 
also consistent with agency theory which does not predict 
the necessary use of one method or the other for firms with 
stable risk over time.
lri general, no change m  the debt betas over time of 
the firms that did not change accounting methods during the 
test period could be discerned. This is consis t e n t  with 
agency theory which predicts that firms which do not change 
methods have stable financial risk over time. The only 
ex c e p t i o n  was a d e c r e a s e  in the debt betas of successlul- 
e f f orts  firms with public debt.
An important finding of this research is that the debt 
betas do not always behave in the same manner as the 
leverage variables. This suggests that the market does 
ccriBider other factors besides leverage when assessing 
financial risk. Therefore, the use of leverage as a 
su r r o g a t e  for financial risk may not be a p p r o p r i a t e  in the 
oil and gas industry.
The L i m i t a t i o n s  
Several limi t a t i o n s  are common to nonexper 1m e n t a 1 
st udies such as this one. First, it was not possible to 
take a random sample from the entire p o p u l a t i o n  of all oil 
and gas 1 irms m  order to assign them to the full-cost and
s u c c e s s f u l - e f f o r t s  categories. However, random samples 
were taken from each category of firms in this study, 
except for firms changing methods for which the entire 
p o p u l a t i o n s  were examined. Secondly, no independent 
variables were m a n ipulated because it was not possible to 
change the firm's level of financial risk in order to
o b serve if accoun t i n g  method c h a n g e s  would then occur.
In this study, the debt beta was obtained by taking a
weighted d i f f e r e n c e  of the asBet and equity betas. It may
be possible to obtain the debt beta through use of 
alt e r n a t e  methods, which were not explored here. Also, in 
this study, a common aBset beta was assumed for all firms 
in the industry. There may be some diffe r e n c e s  in the risk 
of holding crude pet r o l e u m  among firms in the industry.
Only financial riBk was e x a m i n e d  ae being a possible 
determinant of accounting method choice. Other variables
which may affect that choice were not considered. However, 
an attempt was made to control for some confo u n d i n g  
variables. First, c o m p a n i e s  which deal primarily in areas 
other than in the explo r a t i o n  and p r o d u c t i o n  of crude 
pe t r o l e u m  and natural gas were e l i m i n a t e d  ae potential 
sample firms b e cause they would not be Influenced 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  by the choice of full cost or successful 
e f forts accounting. Also, firm size was c o n t r o l l e d  to some 
extent by using separate s a mples for firms having public 
debt and firms having only private debt. The public debt
^3
firms were in general larger than the firms with private 
d e b t .
The findings of this research appear to have important 
imp l i c a t i o n e  as to the design of future research projects.
s u r r o g a t e  for financial risk. The market c o n s i d e r s  
additional information in assessing a firm's financial 
risk. Future research could be performed which would 
attempt to reveal what factors are c o n s idered by the market 
in assessing this risk.
Future research could also attempt to uncover what 
other factors enter into the decision to change accounting 
m e t hods  in the oil and gas industry. It appears that firms 
that c hange to the full-cost accounting method ex p e r i e n c e  
an increase in risk prior to the change, but other factors 
may also enter into the change decision. Also, it is 
apparent that other factors enter into the decision to 
change to the s u c c e s s ! u l - e f f o r t s  method of accounting. 
However, this study makes a significant c o n t r i b u t i o n  to 
the dir e c t i o n  of future research through the introduction  
of the debt beta.
Future Research
can no longer a u t o m a t i c a l l y  be accepted as a
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Sample oi Firms Main t a i n i n g  
Full-Cost Accounting 
With Public Debt
F l r m N o .     N a m e  __ _ _______________________ ______________ ___
1 Mitchell Energy and Development
Apache Corporation
3 F o g o  P r o d u c i n g
4 Forest Oil Corpo r a t i o n
9 Triton Energy C o rporation
6 Sou t h w e s t e r n  Energy Company
7 W a i noco
8 Universal Resources
9 Con s o l i d a t e d  Oil and Gas
10 Wilshire Oil Company oi Texas
Note: All firms in this sa m p l e  were used In testing the
h y p o t h e s e s  w h i c h  m a t c h e d  t h e  1 9 7 7  a n d  1 9 6 6  r i s k  l e v e l s .
1 OQ
Sample of Firms Maint a i n i n g  
S u c c e s s f u i - E f f o r t a  Accounting  
With Public Debt
Firm Nu. Name
1 Mobil Oil C o r p o r a t i o n
L Texaco Incorporated
j AfiCCJ
4 Sun Compan y
c S tandard Oil Company
6 U n o r a 1
7 Amerada Hess C o rporation
a Diamond Shamrock Corpo r a t i o n
9 Quaker State Cor poratlon
1 □ Louisiana Land and Explo r a t i o n
Note: All firms in this sa m p l e  were used in testin
h y p o t h e s e s  which matched the 1977 and 1986 risk lev
101
Sample of Firma Maintaining 
Full-Cost Accounting 
With Only P r i vate Debt
F i r m  N o  . N a m e _____   _ _ _______
1 Callon P e troleum
2 McFarland Energy Incorporated
9 Patrick Pet r o l e u m  Company
4 G a 1ax y Oil
b Basic Earth S c ience Systems
b Hershey Oil C o r p o r a t i o n
7 Summit Energy
& bayou Res o u r c e s  Incorporated
9 G e o R e s o u r c e s  Incorporated
IQ Amacan R e sources
11 TGX C o r p o r a t i o n
12 Chapman Energy Incorporated
12 Federated Natural R e s ources
14 Plains R e sources
15 Presidio Oil
lb S w i f t  E n e r g y  C o m p a n y
17 Kitnbark Oil an d  G a s  C o m p a n y
lb Saxon Oil Company
19 Harken Oil end Gas
20 Ranger O i 1
21 P a r t n e r s  Oil Company
Co n t i n u e d  on Next Page
10^
Sample of Firms Maintaining  
Full-Cost Accountlng  
With Only P r i v a t e  Debt 
< Cont inued >
Firm No. Name
22 Whiting Petroleum
2 3 Evergreen Res o u r c e s  Incorporated
24 Normandy Oil and Gas
20 Prime Energy C o r poration
26 Striker Petroleum
27 Valex Pet r o l e u m  Company
28 Alta Energy Corpo r a t i o n
29 Falcon Oil and Gas Company
30 Toklan Gil Corpo r a t i o n
31 Chaparral R e s ources
32 Roberts Oil and Gas Incorporated
Note: The first ten firms on this list were included i
the teBts matching the 1977 and 1986 risk levels. Hers 
Oil and Arnecan Res o u r c e s  were included only in those 
matched tests and were not used in tests co m p a r i n g  risk 
between full-cost and s u c c e s s ! u 1-e f forts firms for 1986.
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Sample of Firms Maint a i n i n g  
S u c c e s s f u 1 -Efforts Accounting 
With Only Private Debt
Name__________________________________________
GDECO
Park Ohio Industries
Sabirie C o r p o r a t i o n
Wiser Oil Company
Beard Company
Maynard Oil Company
Equity Oil Company
Baruch Foster C o rporation
Western Natural Gas Company
Petrol Industries
Hamilton Oil C o rporation
Alamco
Pyramid Oil Company 
Cobb R e s ources  
Mustang Companies 
Uaenco Incorpor ated 
Burkhart Pet r o l e u m  Company  
B u r t o n * H a « k a  C o rporation 
Oxford Con s o l I d a t e d  
Southern Minerals C o r p o r a t i o n  
Great Eastern Energy and Devel o p m e n t  
Con t i n u e d  on Next Page
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Sample of Firms Maintaining  
S u c c e s s f u 1 - Efforts Accounting 
With Only Private Debt 
(Cont i n u e d )
Firm N o . Name
22 Arch P e t r o l e u m  C o rporation
23 Greenwood Resources Incorporated
24 Norris Oil Corpo r a t i o n
2 5 Willard Pease Gil and Gae Company
26 Plano Pet r o l e u m  Company
27 Taurus P e t r o l e u m  Incorporated
26 Tyrex Oil Company
29 Penn Pacific Corporation
30 Albion International R e sources
31 Explo r a t i o n  Company
32 Oil City P e troleum
33 Big Piney Oil and Gae Company
Note: The first ten lirms on this list were included in
the tests matching the 1977 and 1986 risk levels. Park- 
Ohio Industries, Sabine Corporation, and Wiser Oil Compan 
were included only in tho s e  matched tests and were not us 
in tests com p a r i n g  risk between ful l - c o s t  and successful- 
efforte firms for 1986.
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Klrma Changing To Full-Cost Accounting
F irm No. N a me_____________________________________ Yr. of Change*
1 Hadson Corporation 1 984
2 Tom Brown Incorporated 1984
3 Nahama and Weagant Energy 1986
4 OXUCU Incorporated 1984
Asamera Incorporated 1982
fo Nugget Oil Company 1982
7 Wichita Industries 1984
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Firms Changing To S u c c e a a i u 1 -Efiorts Accounting
F i rm No. _ Name  _____________________________ Yr. of Change
1 Ensources Incorporated 1985
2  Brock Explo r a t i o n  1986
3 Texas International Company 1983
4 KRM Pe t r o l e u m  1985
5 Allegheny and Western Energy 198 3
6 Conquest E x ploration 1986
7 American E x ploiullon C o m pany 1986
APPENDIX B
LIUTU OK ALL EQUITY EIRMS BY YEAR
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A l l - E q u i t y  F i r m s
1977
Numbei N a m e __
1 Hershey Oil Company
2 G e o H e e o u r c e e  Incorporated
0 Wiser Oil Company
4 Equity Oil Company
0 Western Natural Gas Company
109
All-Equity Firms 
1978
Nu m b e r Name
1 Equity Oil Company
2 Wiser Gil Company
9 Chaparral Resources
All-Equity Firms
1979
N u m faei 
1
2 
3
Name  _________    __
McFarland Energy Incorporated 
Wiser Oil Company 
Equity Oil Company
111
All-Equity Firms 
I960
N u mb e i _______ Name _________ _ ______________
1 McFarland Energy Incorporated
2 Amacan Resources
'J Wiser Oil Company
1 12
A 11 -Equ 11 y Fi rme 
1981
N u m b e r  ________ ___N_ame  ________ ___________________________
1 Hario Pet r o l e u m  Company
2 Tyrex Oil Company
H B i g P i n e y G i l a n d G a e  Company
4 Great E b b tern Energy and Development
All-Equity Firms
1982
Number_______  Name
1 Tyrex Oil Company
2 Big Flney Oil and Gae Company
0 Plano P e t r o l e u m  Company
A l l - E q u i t y  F i r m s
1983
N u m b e 1 
1
2
3
Name_______ __________ ____________
Plano Pe t r o l e u m  Company 
Tyrex Pe t r o l e u m  Company 
Biq Piney Oil and Gas Compa
A l l - E q u i t y  F i r m s
1984
Numbei 
1 
« -
3
4
Name____________________________
Plano P e t r o l e u m  Company 
Tyrex Pet r o l e u m  Company 
E x p loration Company 
Big Piney Oil and Gas Company
lie.
A l l “Equity Firms 
1985
Number Name
1 Southern Minerals Corporation
2 Tyrex Pe t r o l e u m  Company
3 E x p l o r a t i o n  Company
4 Big Piney Oil Bnd G b b  Company
117
All-Eq u i t y  Firms 
1986
N u m b e r   N a m e ____________________
1 Southern Minerals C o r p o r a t i o n
2 Plano Pet r o l e u m  Company
U Amacan Resources
APPENDIX C
LIST QF INDUSTR Y - W I D E  ASSET BETAS
BY YEAR
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11 9
Industry-Wide Asset Betas By Year
Year Asset Bet
1^77 1.2376
197U 1.2270
i ‘:7y 1.2813
i yau 1.2626
1 981 1.8230
1 96 2 1 . 7495
1 98 3 1 . 8435
1 964 1.9620
198 b . 7 480
198b . a i a o
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